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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Few philosophers have ever given more consistent etaphasis to
the value and realIty of the spirit than did the Neoplatonist
Plotinus.

Indeed, the reality of the material universe is sup-

pressed almost entirely; whatever degree of reality it has is
merely a reflection of the true reality, which is spiritual.
In vl"ew of this dominant note in the thought o.r, Plotinus,
some defense of the subject matter of this thesis seems in order.
Why bother to discuss an aspect of Plotinus whioh at best can be
of relatively little importance?

This question becomes even more

relevant in the light of a not unjustifiable remark by a reoognized Plotinian scholar that the treatment of matter, particularly of matter oonsidered as the prinCiple of evil, is the "least
coherent and satisfactory part of Plotlnus t s system."l
The discussion proposed in this thesis is not, however, altogether irrelevant

and

unimportant in the study of Plotinus.

Matter may vlell be the "outlaw" in his system, an element to be

lArthur H. Armstrong, "Plotinus's Doctrine of the Infinite
and Its Significance for Christian Thought," Downside Review,
LXXIII (January, 1955), 49.
1

2

£ought against and overcome in the struggle to find one's true
self and to attain union with the ultimate real1ty of the One.
Nevertheless, matter fits into the system as a necessary part of
the whole; and Plotinus is by no means reluotant to treat of it
and its function in his philosophy.
One of the positive benefits of the study to be undertaken
here is that it may serve to indicate some of the inherent difficulties of' an emanational metaphYSics.

Nuoh of the confusion

and "lncoherence n in Plotinus' treatment of matter arises, it
would seem, from an attempt to reconcile his theory of emanation
from the Good with his theory of matter as both a non-entitative
substratum and the principle of evil.
The explicit aim of this thesis is simply to expose the doctrine of Plotinus concerning matter.

The point of emphasis will

be to discover the nature of matter as Plotinus sees it, whether
it be considered as the substratuul of material beings or as the
prime evil and source ot all other secondary evils.

Henee, there

will be no lengthy disoussion of' the relationship between soul
and material bodies or of other such side issues.

Even the

question of the origin or "creationll of' matter will be touched
upon only briefly in Chapter III.
A question whioh is olosely connected with the subject

or

this thesis 1s that of the so-called contradiotion which at least
two eomrrlentators 2 olaim to find between matter as a substratum

2A~ H. Armstrong and. W. R. Inge.

This pOlnt will be dis ..·

3

and matter as the prinoiple of evil.

It was preoisely an interest

in this oontradiotion that eventually led to the choice of the
present subject for this thesis.

The investigations made 1n

preparation for this work have led the author to the oonclusion
that the contradiction in Plotlnus' philosophy of matter--if there
is any oontradlction--does not lIe where Armstrong and Inge find
it.
Though it must be insisted that the direct aim of this thesis
is not to justif,. any personal opinion concerning this alleged
contradiotion, the subject matter and order of treatment has been
so arranged, especially in Chapters III and V, that a case may be
made at the end of Chapter V for the author's view in this
question.
In aocord with the general purpose of this theSiS, the

procedure to be followed will consist almost exclusively in an
exegesis of the text of Plotinus, USe being made both of the
original and of translations.
to Plotinus'

~

Chief consideration will be given

erofesso treatises concerning matter, and these

will be supplemented by enlightening secondary texts.
fifty-tour treatises which comprise the
to be !!. Erofesso discussions of matter:

F~eads

Of the

four may be said

"On the Nature and

Source of Evils," "On Matter," "On Potential and Actual Being,"

cussed In Chapter V, where references to Armstrong and lnge will
be eited.

4
and "On the Impassivity of' the Unembodied.,,3

The purpose of work-

ing direotly with these primary sources is that whatever conclusions are reached conoerning the nature of matter will be based on
Plotinus himself and not on the opinions of his commentators.
A

sparing use of secondary sources will be made for the pur-

pose of obtaining leads into the meaning of Plotinus himself.
Suoh sources will also be used to indicate ooncurrence of opinion
and, in a few instances, divergence of opinion.
Mention must also be made of the fact that this thesis 1s
oonoerned only with an exposition of Plotinus' theories of sensible
matter, Le., the matter which is involved in the material universe.
Sensible matter is to be distinguished from the intelligible
matter about whioh Pl~tinus also speaks.

The same treatise 4 which

provides ·the main source for Plotinus' dootrine on sensible matter
as the substratum of material beings is also the chief source ooncerning the nature of intelligible matter.

A brief disoussion of

the nature of intelligible matter and its difrerences from sensible matter will be taken up briefly in an appendix to this thesis.

By way of further introduction to the subject of this thesiS,
the general reader will find a brie.f his torical sketch of Plotiuus
and an account of his writings very helpful.
3I. 8; II. 4; II. 5; and III. 6 respectively. For an explanation of the references to the bnneads of P10tinus see Chapter
II, p. 12, n.3.

4II • 4.

The Neoplatonio school of philosophy arose in Egypt in the
third oentury

t~.• D.

Its reputed founder is Ammonius Saocas, a

porter at the dooks of Alexandrla. 5 The first formulations of
Neoplatonism, however, oome to us from a pupil of Ammonius and
the greatest exponent of that mystioal philosophy, Plotinus.
As a philosophical system Neopla.tonism did not spring fullblown from the head either of Ammoniu8 or Plotinus; but, with
its elements or Platonism and Aristotelianism as well as NeoPythagoreanism and Stoicism, it
the Greek tradition of thought.

sho~

itself a true progeny of

The vigor and appeal of Neo-

platonism is attested to by the fact that within a short time it
came to dominate philosophical speculation in the Mediterranean
world. 6
Very little is known of the personal history of Plotinus;
praotically everything that is known cames down to us from his
most

f~ous

disciple, Porphyry.

The reason for this lack of

informatIon must be attributed ohiefly to Plotinus himself,
whose shame at being imprisoned in the body was so great, his
biographer tells us, that he could never be induoed to relate the
facts of his life or even to sit for a portrait painter. 7

5Wllliam Turner, "Neop1atonism, ft Catholic Enclclopedia (New
York, 1907-12), X, 742.
6.wl11iam a. Inge, "Plotinus," Encyclopaedia Britannica
(Chicago, 1939), XVIII, 81.
7PorPhyry, Life of Plotinu8, c. 1. Porphyry's Life of
Plotinus can be found:1n the original Greek in PlotinIiOpera,

6
Plotinus was born in Egypt (at Lyco or Lycopolis, according
to the word of 1Unapius 8 ) in either

204

or

205

A.D.

He began the

study of philosophy in Alexandria. at the age of twenty-seven.
After experienoing dissatisfaction 14"i th the teachers he encountered there, he was finally introduced to Armnonius Saccas;
a.nd after hearing him lecture Plotinus is said to have remarked:
"This is the man I have been looking for.,,9
Plotinus spent eleven ye8.rs ii'i lih Ammonius and made sueh progress that he conoeived a desire to investigate Persian and
Indian thought.

To fulfil his desire he joined the ill-fated

expedition of Emperor Gordian against Persia in

242.

After the

death of Gordian Plotinus barely escaped with his own life.

He

returned to Rome around the age of forty and there established
his sohool.

In his last years Plotinus oontracted diphtheria,

beoame hoarse, and began to lose his Sight.

He retired to

Campania, where he died in 210.
From Prophyry's desoription of him, Plotinus was apparently
a man

0:('

very noble oharacter.

He seem.s to have made few 1:(' any

enemies and was able to inspire trust in himself.

He led an

eds. Paul Henry and Hans-Rudolph Sohwyzer (Paris, 1951), vol. I,
1-41. An English version may be found in Plotinu8, the Enneads,
translated into English by Stephen HacKenna, 2nd ed.-r9vlsed by
B. S. Page (London, [95g).
.
8
Eunapius, Lives ££ the Philosophers ~ Sophists, n. 455.
The text referrea to is tEat In Philostratus a.nd Euna~ius, with an
English translation by ~"'ilmer Cave ~JrIght {London, 19 2}, p. 352.
9Porphyry, ~, c. 3.

7
asoetical life of oontempt for the body.
ly, gentle, and singularly engaging. 10

He is desoribed as kind-

Porphyry met Plotinus when the master was about fifty-nine
years old.

Porphyry says that by that time he had already

written tWenty-one treatises, the rirst of which were composed
ten years previous to their meeting.

During the next six years

Plotinus oomposed twenty-four more treatises, and in the last
year of his life he wrote another nine.

Porphyry divides the

quality of the works according to this temporal scheme, the early
ones manifesting less power and maturity, the middle group representing the peak of Plotinus' er.forts, and the last nine reveal ...
ing a decline in mental strength.

11

Plotinus personally entrusted the task of revising and
edi ting his works to Porphyry.

Porphyry says tha t Plo tinus was

very careless in the mechanical details of composition, such as
the joining and spelling of words.

The style or the fifty-four

treatises reflects the fact that Plotinua wrote them out quickly
after having thoroughly worked them out in his mind.

The emphasis

is on the thought rather than the mode of expression, and
Plotinus himself would never reread what he wrote. 12
In editing Plotinus' work Porphyry divided the treatises

lOIbid. , c. 2.3.
llIbid. , c. 6.

-

l2 Ib1d • , c. 8.

8

topically into six groups of nine treatises, whence the title
~nneads.

Although such a grouping was bound to be somewhat

arbitrary, the first Bnnead deals in general with ethioal questions, the second with physical questions, the third with the
philosophical implications of the

~1Orld,

the fourth with the Soul,

the fifth with the second hypostasis (Nous), and the sixth with
such topics as being, the Good, and free Will.13
'l'he philosophioal synthesis which Plotinus aohieved has
shoWn itself capable of winning enthusiastic admirers in our own
times as well as in the third and fourth centuries.

Doubtless

much of the "popularity" of Plotinus is accounted for by the
mystical turn which his thought takes, especially in the desire
of the soul to return "home" in union with the One.

The stress

which he lays on the dignity of the human person and the importance of spiritual values over the merely material also attraot
admiration and acceptance.
An estimate of the value and

~portance

of Plotinus' philoso-

phy can bes"t; be sought from recognized authori ties in the field.
Those who seem to show excessive admiration for PlotlnuB can be
passed over. 14

Therefore, two outstanding Plotinian SCholars

13 Ibid ., cc. 24-26.

l~E.G., see \Vil1iam R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus
(London, 1929), I, 7-10. See also~ornas :ful t taker, The £160llatonists, 2nd ad. (Cambridge, Eng., 1928), p. 33, where-pfotlnus
s styled as tithe greatest individual thinker between Aristotle
s.nd Descartes."

9
whose evaluations seem moderate and well-balanced have been seleoted.
Concluding a ohapter of oritioal analysis of Plotinum, Armstrong has this to say of the value of his philosophy: "Plotinus is
not only the most vital oonneoting link the history of European
philosophy, as being the philosopher 1n whom the Hellenic traditio
in full development and maturity was brought into touoh with the
beginnings of Christian philosophy.

He is also one of the few

ancient philosophers whom we oan still honor, though not

uncritica~

1'1. as a master, and not simply study as a historioal curiosity-.rt15
On the point of Plotinus t importanoe in the history of phi-

losophy Father Henry makes the following evaluation:
Heir to the great philosophies of the anoient world,
those of Plato, Aristotle, and the StOiCS, he borrowed
from all of them the insights whioh he needed, but without surrendering at any point the dominant influenoe ot
Platonism. Eoleotic in appearance but powerfully unified
by the strength of a single pervading impulse, his system
has, by various ohannels often obsoure and indireot, oome
to be and remained one of the guiding foroes in the
thought of the West, whether Christian or seoular, from
Augustine and Scotus Erigena to Dean Inge and Bergson.
He 1s the last great philosopher of antiqUity, and yet in
more than one respect, and notably in the stress which he
plaoes on thelgutonomy of spirit, he is a pre ours or of
modern times.

15Arthur H. Armstrong, The Arch1tecture of the Intelli~1ble
Universe in the PhilosophI or-Plot!nus (Cambr1Qge;-Eng., i9 0),
p.

126. -

-

-

16paul Henry, S.J., "Plotinus' Place in the History of
Thought," an introduction to Plotinus, the Enneads, trans. bZ
Stephen MaoKenna, 2nd ed. revIsed by B.-s7 Page (London, T956),
p. xxxiii.
- -

10

The subject of this thesis, then, is simply one phase of the
highly unified system of Plotinus.

After a short conspectus of

his whole philosphy, a close examination will be undertaken ot
his theories concerning the nature of sensible matter.

CHAPTER II
A CONSPECTUS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLOTINUS
Before a beginning can be made on the question of the nature
of matter in Plotinus t system, it is essential that a broad outline of his entire philosophy be sketched.

It is true of any

metaphysic, and especially so of tha.t of Plotinu8, that one part
involves all the others, and that anyone part can be understood
adequately only when seen in view of the whole.
The nature of the Enneads themselVes demands that some preliminary summary of their content be made before taking up one
particular point.

Both their style and the word of porphyryl

testify to the fact that the individual treatises were written by
Plotinus as the result of discussions in his philosophical circle.
The treatises were not written in any systematic order; and, as
Brehier observes,2 anyone Ennead will take up all the problems
of the system or, at least, will presuppose the whole system as
already known.

Thus in the four

~

2rofesso treatises conoerning

matter Plotinus presumes that the reader is familiar with his

I porp hyry, Life, c.

-

2Flmile Brehier,

p. 10.

1!

4.
phi1osophie de PIot1n (PariS, ~92~),
-11

12

doctrine of emanation and his ethics of purification and return.
Though Flotinus did not coin the word himself, it is oustomary to oha.raoterize his metaphysics as "emanational."

E:manation

amounts to an explanation of all reality in terms of a progressive
produotion of all levels of reality from one ultimate source.
Plotinus calls the ultimate source the One (TO Hv).

The One then

produoes the next level of reality, which is Intelleot or Mind (6
vou~).

NOllS, in its turn, produces Soul (~ tUX~)t and Soul brings

matter to order to produoe the material, sensible world.
Flotinus' continual striving after higher unifioation and his
realization of the imperfeotion of multiplic1ty led him to posit
absolute simplicity and unity as the supreme reality in his metaphysics.

The unity of the primal hypostasis, the One, 1s such as

to exclude the slightest shadow of duality.

Not only does this

preclude the gross multiplicity of quantitative extension, but
even intelligenoe must not be ascribed to the One, s1nce, as
Plotinus sees it, intelligence always involves the duality of
knower and known. 3

3E.G., see Enneads, III. 8. 9; VI. 7. 40; VI. 9. 6. In the
citations from Piotinus throughout the reat of the theSis, sinoe
the .b"'nneads will always be referred to, the ti tle will be omitted.
The Noman numeral refers to the Ennead, the first Arabic numeral
indicates the treatise within a p~·ticular Ennead, and the second
Arabic numeral indicates the chapter number. When a reference is
made to spec1£lc lines in the Greek text, the chapter number will
be followed by a comma and then the line numbers. For hnneads
I-III line numbers will refer to the edition of Paul Henr1 and
Hans-Rudolph Schwyzer, Plotini Opera, Vol. I (Paris, 19S1). Line
references in Enneads IV-VI wIll refer to the text of Emile

13
Almost as frequently as he calls the primal principle the
One, Plotinu8 will refer to it as the Good (-r6.yae6v).

This does

not mean, however, that the first hypostasis is good as, for
example, a man is good.

The use of the term indicates that the

first principle is the Absolute Good, the Good by essence. 4 Even
when the term !tthe One" is used of' the first principle, it is not
an indication of what that principle is, but it is merely a denial
of any mUltiPlicity.5
The One, then, is the Unknowable, the Undefinable; and the
only approach to a science of the One is through a "negative
theology."
One.

Strictly speaking, no predication can be made of the

Even the terms One and Good merely point out the reality of

the first principle in the best terms available;6 and if the One
is said to be a cause, all that this indicates 1s a dependence in
the effect rather th~~ any modification of the One. 7
The utter supremacy of the One is further brought out by the
fact that it completely transcends the realm of "beings."

Being

for Plotinus, and for the general run of Greek philosophers, is
that which is limited and determined to some particular for.m.
Brehiar, Enneades, Vols. IV-VI 2 (Paris, 1927-38).

4E• g .,

5v.

II. 9. 1; V. 5. 13; VI. 7. 38.

5. 6.

611 • 9. 1.
7VI " 9 .. 3.

But

the One, as the source of all forms, is itself without form and
determination; hence, it is beyond being in the sense that it is
not limited to being tfthis" or "that. u8

The One, then, is

infinite and undetermined in the sense of being above nbeing,"
form, and I1mltation. 9
The One, as has been said, is the principle from which all
proceeds. lO Itself not a being, it produces by the infinity of
its productive powerll the whole realm of beings, from the second
hypostasis, Nous, on down to the last vestige of reality in the
material universe.

This production is either mediate or

immedlate",12
The perfection of the One results naturally in the production
l
of the levels of reality beneath itself. ) The next level below
the One and produced directly by that first principle is the

Bv.

5. 6.

90r • Leo Sweeney, "Infinity in Plotinus, Part I," Gre~OrianU!,l!t
XXXVIII (1957), 530. Together with Part II, ~., pp. 71 -732,
this article is a good, detailed account of the notion of infinity in Plotinus", The author shows that Plotinus predicates infinity of the One,in two senses, one by negation of determination
and form, the other in relation to the active power of the One to
produce an infinity of beings.

IOE.g., V. 2.
llSes note 9 above.

l2v. 4. 1.

-

l)Ibid.

15
second hypostasis of the Intelligible Realm, Nous. 14-

Nous is the

image of the One and the most perfect of beings; but, since it
prooeeds from the One, it is necessarily of a lower degree of
perfection.
Whereas the One transcends the category of being, Nous is the
first reality which is limited to a determined form and, thereby,
to the realm of being.

In fact, Plotinus says that all beings

are contained in Nous and are even identical with Nous, since all
the rest of reality is produced from its according to the ideas
which it has. 15
Though the second hypostaSis approaches as close as possible
to the perfection and simplicity of the One, nevertheless, it is
an essential duality.

Nous is the vision of the One; and--not to

go into all the complexities of its procession from and conversion
toward its Prior--lt is brought to form and determined precisely
by its vision of the One. 16 Moreover, from the vision of the One
Nous oomes to a vision or knowledge of itselr. 17 Obviously there
is not here the perfeot unity of the non-intellective One.

nBut

l~ous is variously translated as Intelligence, Mind, Spirit,
Intellectual-Principle. Some commentators have compared it with
Aristotle's First Mover as 'rhought thinking Itself. Throughout
this thesis the second hypostasis will simply be designated by
the English transliteration "Nous. TT

15v.

3. 5.

16v. 2. 1;

v. 4.

2.

17V• 3. 7; V. 6. 5.

16
if Intelli86nCe [.e., Nou~ is both thinker and thought, this
implies duality and Intelligence is not simple and hence not the
One.

1f t moreover, Intelligence contemplates some object other

than itself, then surely there is an object better than and
superior to it.

Even if Intelligence contemplates itself and

simultaneously that which is better than it, it still is only of
secondary rank. nl8
Plotinus also makes Nous the locality of Ideas (~a efOn or at

,toeal
, )
•

But P10tinus makes an advance over his professed master,

Plato, who left the Ideas hierarchically arranged but distinct
entities.

In Nous the Ideas are

~~ified

into a single hypostaSis

as the various propositions of a science form one totality.19
There remains distinction within unity. There are ideal arche20
types even for individual beings,
and it 1s according to these
Ideas in Nous that all else canes to be.
According to the degree of perfection which .it possess
Nous also produces the next level of reality beneath it; this is
21
the Great Soul.
Just as Nous is an image of its source, so too
IBvI. 9. 2, 36-40. Il'rans. by Joseph Katz, The Philosophl2!..
Plotinus (New York, 19S0), p. 141.

19v • 9.8.
20V. 7.

21

Plotinus frequently calls the third hypostasis merely Soul
will refer to it as the Soul of the Universe
In this thesis the third hypostaSis will be
referred to as the Great Soul to distinguish it from individual
souls.

en

~uxn).
He also
(~ WUx~ ~ou 8AOU).

17

the Great Soul is an image of Nous. 22

The i~lianent activity of

the Great Soul is a contemplation of' its prior principle; and in
contemplat1nr- Nous it participates in the Ideas according to which
it produces material realitles. 23

The Great Soul is the third and

last hypostasis of the Intellectual Healm an'd is the intermediary
between the intelligible a nd sensible orders. 24
Besides its immanent activity of contemplation the Great Soul
is also productive of its image,

i~ich is the sensible universe. 25

Having within itself the images of the Ideas of all beings, the
Great Soul acts upon matter to bring into existence the beings of
this sensible realm.

26

The nature of matter will, of course, be

treated at length in the chapters to follow, but it may be noted
here that P10tinus views material beings as tending toward nonbeing.

\IJhatever reality they have comes from a reflection of the

I1eas passed along to them from the Great Soul.
Plotinus conceives the whole emanational process as a result
of a certain natural necessity.

All levels of reality which par-

tiCipate in the reality of the One have the power to produce an
image of themselves.

Although P10tInu8 does have some diffIculty

22V. 2. 1.

23 rv . 3. 11.
24

Ibid.;
25 IV • 8.
26 11 •

IV. 8. 7.

7.

3. 17.

18
in assigning a reason why the all-perfeot and oompletely self-

contained One should ever produce anything below itselt,27 he
tries to give some explanation tor it from the analogy ot other
beings which, upon reaohing the maturity of their perfeotion,
generate offspring. 28

This oommunication of perfection he observe

not only 1n living beings, but to some extent even in lifeless
entities, e.g., tire imparts warmth, ice cools, drugs produce
their various etfects.

On

the other hand, the One can be said to

produce other beings freely in the sense that it has no need of
anything else for the plenitude ot its perfeotion.

When a lower

level of reality emanates from its souroe, this involves no change
or diminution on the part of the souroe itself.
In his effort to explain what he means by produotion of the
various hypostases, Plotinus has recourse to images to illustrate
his pOint.

His favorite image for the emanational process is that
of light radiating from the sun. 29 The One is the light illumInating the seoond hypostasis.

Noue, in its turn, illuminates the

Great Soul; and the Great Soul shines on the darkness of matter to
produce the last level of reality in the sensible world.
Plotinus compares the process to an overflowing spring. 30
270f • Brehier, 1! philosophie ~ Plotln, p.

2Sv.

4.

1.

29E • g ., I. 7. 1; V.I. 6; V. 3. 12.

JOE•G., III. 8. 10; V. 2. 1.

41.
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He uses
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other examples too, but the source is always considered to remain
unchanged in the process.

For this reason the example of radia-

tion from the sun was his favorite, since he thought that the sun
remained undiminished in its shining forth.
Paralleling the outward and downward movement of emanation
in Plotinus' philosophy is an upward, returning movement of all
reality back to its source.

It would probably be a fair estimate

to say that it is the movement of return to the One that sets the
tone to Plotinus' philosophy, whioh is centered in man.

It is by

rising from the knowledge of himself to higher and higher unity
that man comes to a knowledge of the Intelligible Realm to which
he is fundamentally united.)l
At every level of reality there is a return back upon the
source, Nous oontemplating the One and the Great Soul contemplating Nous.

P1otinus' doctrine of return is most manifest, however,

in the return of man to his true self in union with the Intelligible PrinCiples.

Individual souls, which are unified in the Great

sou1,)2 fulfil their produotive power and produce their ~age in
the materiel world.

This is natural and necessary.

But while the

individual soul always retains some contact with the Intelligible
Realm, it may nevertheless become forgetful of its source through
an excessive concern with the individual body with which it is

31V. 1.

32E• g., IV. 3. 4.

20

joined. 33

This distraction from the Intellectual Realm and con-

cern for things of sense is the "fallt! of the soul; it can redeem
itself only through a conversion or return toward its higher,
intellectual phase.
In the treatise entitled "On Dialectic,,34 Plotinus maps out
the route whioh the BOul must take in its journey back to its
source in the One.

The first stage consists in a conversion and

purification from the lower life of the senses and the material
world.

Once within the Intelleotual Realm the quest for higher
unity leads the soul onward to union with the one. 35 Thus does
the human soul join the whole of reality in a return to the
source from which it proceeded.
Plottnus t philosophical system, as has been seen, is a two-

fold movement, namely, the emanational pattern of production
from a primal principle snd the ascetlcal return of the soul back
to its source by purification and higher unification.

The role

of matter in the context of these two movements remains to be
explained and oonstitutes the subject proper to this thesis.

3.3rv. 3. 1$; IV. 8. 4 •

.341. 3.
35Plotinus conoeives this union as an ecstatic experience.
Porphyry relates that Plotinus enjoyed this union four t~es
during the years in which he knew the master. See Porphyry, Life,
c. 23.

-

CHAPTE.'R III
MATTER AS SUBSTRATUM
In the treatise whioh he explicitly devotes to exploring the
aature of matter Plotinus opens with a point of oommon agreement.
tAll those," he says, "who have spoken concerning what is called
natter

(n

~An),

and who have arrived at a conoeption of its nature,

unanimously assert, that it is a certain subject and receptacle of
"orms."l
~er.

In this passage Plotinus uses two words to describe mat-

He calls it a subject or substratum (~~oxe(~evov) and a re-

peptacle (~noooxn), the former being the Aristotelian term, the
~atter the Platonic. 2
~o

In the oourse of this chapter and the one

follow, it will become clear that, while both elements are in-

volved, the notion of "substratum" 1s the chief one in the mind
of Plotinu8, and that matter is not so much a recipient of forms
as it is a surface, so to speak, upon which they oome and go.
In an effort to establish the existenoe of matter in the
sensible realm P1otinu8 closely follows the argumentation of
III. 4. 1, 1-4. Trans. by Thomas Tarlor, Se1eot Works of
!Plotinus, ed. G. R. S. Head (London, 1929), p. 22.
2See Emile Brehier, Plotin, Enneades (PariS, 1924-38), II,
56, n. 1.
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Aristotle in the Metaphysics. 3

From observation ot the changes in

sensible substances Aristotle concluded to a common underlying
principle which is capable of possessing both terms of the change.
Matter is the potentiality for that which will aotually exist
atter change takes place; and this is true of the four types of
change, namely, substantial, quantitative, qualitative, and looal.
Though Plotinus restricts the use of the term "matter" more
than Aristotle does,4 he employs the same basio argument as
Aristotle to show that bodies
trom themselves. 5

(cr~aTa)

have a substratum different

In the changes which occur in the basic ele-

ments (crTOtxeta) it is found that there is a continuity between
the terms of the change.

One element does not suddenly oease to

be and another suddenly arise

fr~u

non-being.

What actually

happens is that one form (eloos) replaces another.

Matter is the

stable member whioh receives one form upon the loss of another.
Decay, Plotinus says, is also an indication that bodies are
compounds of matter and torm. 6 The !brce of this argument is from
analogy.

For example, a drinking vessel is reduced to its gold,

3Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII, 2, 1069 b, 3-27.
4Plotlnus uses the term "mattern to designate what would
compare roughly with Aristotle's flrirst matter." This restricted
use will become more evident below when the question of matter as
potentiality is treated. cr. Brehier, Enneades, II, 74.

5II • 4. 6.
6 Ibid •

-
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the gold to water; water too may be ohanged into something else.
Re then goes on to oonolude:

"It is neoessary, also, that the

elements should either be torm, or the f"irst matter, or that
whioh oonsists of" matter and form.
that they should be form.
have bulk and magnitude?
are corrupted.

But it is impossible, indeed,

J:i1or how, without matter, could they
Nor are they the first matter; for they

Henoe, they consist of matter and form.

Their

form determines them aooording to qQallty and shape; their matter
is an indefinite subjeot, beoause it is not a fo1'm.,,7
Onoe he haa proved the existenoe of matter as the substratum
of forms in sensible bodies, Plotinus goes on to investigate what
sort of thing this matter is.

He does this by way of negation.

trha fundatilental requirement of matter is that it be matter for
all sensible beings, not 1ne1'ely for sOIlle, as olay is matter for
the produots of the potter, but is already something in itselr.

8

Henoe, it must be none of those things "Whioh are found in fully
oonstituted bodies.
Plotinus praotioally takes it for granted that matter is
that whioh laoks all quality.

"The distinotive oharacteristio of

matter is the negation of form, sinee to laok quality is to be
wi thout torm. ,,9

Any qualifioation that matter lllight have would

7~., 14-19.

Trans. revised from Taylor, pp. 27-28.

811 • 4. 8.

911 •

4.

I), 23-24.

See also II.

4. 8.
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be a reflection in it of the Ideas or lOt~oi 10 of the Intellectual
r\ealm, and this would cons ti tu te it a.s s OIlle partioular thini'::',
But matter is precisely If}..oyoS,ll and only as suoh 1s it capable
of providing a substratum for all sensible beings.
'fhe first conclusion whioh Plotinus draws from the fact that
matter laoks all cpalificatlon is that it 1s in no sense of the
word a body.

Matter itself is inoorporeal in contradistinction

to objeots of sense perception, whioh are said to be oorporeal.
Hateriality in this sense already implies a partioipation in the
logoi. 12
Since the substratum of material bodies oannot itself be a
body, it follows that all the attributes of body must also be
denied of matter.

Hence, matter is colorless; it is neither hot

nor cold, though it can receive either heat or coldness.

Further-

more, matter cannot have any of those properties which accompany
10
P10tinus speaks of both Efoos. and AOYOS as determining
elements of sensible bodies. The Eron are arohetypes of material
beings and are located, in di1'terent degrees of unity, in both
Nous and the Great Soul. The }..OYOl are, roughly speaking, produotive principles of material beings. They are also spoken of as
existing both in Nous and the Great Soul, though most frequently
in conneotion with the latter, since the Great Soul is the creato
of the material universe. There are also AOYO\ a~Ep~Q~\KO(, whic
are prinoiples of determination immanent within sensible beings.
In this thesis Efoos (pl., Efon) will be translated as Idea
or form. AdyoS, which is variously translated as reason, HeasonPrinciple, raison formelle, will Simply be rendered by the English
transliteration Prom the Greek, i.e., logos (pl., logoi).

llyI. 3. 7, 8.
12 II.

I.

4..

12.
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quantity, such as a particular size. shape, or weibht.
no less than quality, is a sign of logos and Idea.

Quantity,

13

Matter, then, as lacking all quality, must be utterly uncomposed and simple in itself, since composition would mean the
presence of both a qualifying and a qualified element.

Matter,

rather, is that which is completely open to whatever comes to it;
and whatever quality it does receive is outside of and foreign to
matter itself.

~lhatever

qualifications matter has come not from

itself but from the forms which mould matter. 14
A problem which seems to have held particular interest for
Plotinu8 was the relationship of matter and magnitude (& ~lYEeOS).
His thesis was, of course, that matter itself is without any magnitude.

He had to face as adversaries to this position not only

the stoics. but also others whom Brehier conjectures to be interpreters or Plato's Timaeus. l5 The Stoics held that all reality is
a body with a determined size; hence, matter too has a certain
size.
(~

The others based their objection on Plato's concept of space

xwpa) as a receptable of qualities; they concluded that a re-

ceptacle of qualities must be of a oertain volume and have
magnitude.
In answer to the stoic objection that all reality is

13

II.

4. 8.

14Ib1d •
.............
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corporeal and extended, Plotinus contents himself with merely
recalling to mind the fact that there are realities which are
not qUantified. 16 ThoUt'!,h he does not mention pa.rticular examples
but simply lays down the general principles that whatever is unembodied (aa~a~ov) lacks quantity, it is not difficult to find
examples of such realities in his system, e.g., the hypostases
of the intellectual Realm and, in the sensible world, the whole
range of qualities, which even the Stoics themselves admitted
have no magnitude. 11

But matter, he says, is &a~a~os, and so

it has no, quantity and magnitude.
To explain how bodies do become quantified, Plotinus distinguishes between the .form or Idea of quantity and that being
which has quantity.

'~ua.ntity

(i.e., the form) is not itself

quantlf'led, but only those things a.re quantified which participat
in quantity. 18

Just as a

bein.~

becomes white through the prasenc

of the logos of whiteness, which has no color of itself, so too
that which gives a being a certain size has no size of itself,
but is the logos of size or quantity.19

But does this mean that

quantity enters into matter and extends that which was previously
condensed?

16 II.

"Not at all.

4.

The matter was not contracted in a

9.

17Br6hier, Enneades, II,

18

II. l.f.. 9.

19 Ibid •
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small place; but principle ~hich gives forms to matte!] gives it
a magnitude which it did not previously possess, just as it gives
qualities which it had not previously possessed."

20

But suppose, as Plotinus did suppose, that someone should
ask what more is needed to constitute a body in existence beyond
magnitude and the other bodily qualities.

If the answer is that

some substratum is needed to receive these qualifications, then
the objeotion based on the Timaeus can be raised.

This sub-

stratum, as recipient of the various bodily qualities, must be
of a oertain size or mass (OYKO~), hence of a certain magnitude.
Othe~se,

how could it be a receptacle for for.ms?

If all ex-

tension and magnitude is due to form, matter will have no
funotion in bodies.

Matter without magnitude would seem to be

a name signifying nothing.

21

Plotinus begins his reply by admitting that in the

ordina~

experience of man that which is shaped, moulded, and changed does
have a definite mass.

But he goes on to observe that such things

as wood or gold or anything else from which various products are
fashioned are not the matter about which he i8 talking.
are already entities in their own right.

These

The case is altogether

different with pure matter, i.e., the matter which is the

20Ib1d., 13-15.
Enneades;-II, 6).
21 11 •

4.

11.

Trans. based on the French of Brehier,
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substratum of all sensible beings.

22

It 1s not necessarily true, Plotinus observes, that volume
or mass is essential to being a recipient.

The Great Soul, for

example, contains everything within it in an unextended unity.
The reason why matter receives its forms in spatial extension is
that it is the type of substratum which is capable of receiving
extension.

But it must receive its magnitude and volume, lije

everything else it receives, from something outside itself.
Matter, then, is merely an image or phantom

(~avTaa~a)

of

mass or a primary aptness for extension; whence some bave identified matter with the void (Tb KEV6v).
Plotinus summarizes his doctrine on matter and mass as tollows:
Hence we have something which is to be described
not as small or great but as the great and small; for
it is at once a mass and a thing without magnitude, in
the sense that it is the matter on which mass is based
and that, as it changes from great to small and small
to great, it traverses magnitude. Its very indeterminateness is a mass in the same sense--that ot being a
reCipient of magnitude • • • •
In the order of things without mass, all that is
Idea possesses delimitation, eaoh entity for itself,
so that the conception of mass has no place in them;
matter, not delimited, having in its own nature no
stability, swept into any or every form by turn, ready
to go here, there, and everywhere, beoomes a thing of
multiplioity. Driven into all shapes, beooming al~3
things, it has that muoh of the character of mass.

23 Ibid., 33-43. Trans. revised from Stephen MaoKenna,
Plotlnus, ~he Enneads, 2nd ad. revised by B. S. Page (London,
[9 5§) ), pp .112-13.
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Is matter simply empty spaoe for P1otinus?

One recent com-

mentator thinks so,24 but Whittaker interprets the very passages
oonsidered above as P1otinus' argument against those who would
make matter merely the void or empty space.

25

Plotinus himself

remarks that the desoription of matter as "size without content"
26
has led some to identify matter with the void.
The implication
is, however, that Plotinu8 is not one of those who have made such
an identification.

Though he insists on the unreality and non-

being of matter, as will be brought out below, his theory of
matter as having no extension or magnitude, while at the same
time being a potency for magnitude, seems to give it more reality
than the nothingness of empty space.
Early 1n his treatment of sensible matter P10tinus remarks
that matter, because it is not a form, is the indeterminate substratum (1'0 61tol(€ (ll€VOV b:oP\O'1'ov) of the elements oomposed of
matter and form. 27

Later on in the same treatise he takes up

the question of the relationship between matter and infinity
(1'0

~1t€\pov)

and indeterminateness (TO b:OP\O'TOV), and he oomes

24Philip v. Plstorius, P10tinus and Neop1atonlsm (Cambridge,
Eng., fI9~), p • .3.

----------

2~vhittaker, The Neo-Platonists, p. 70.

--- ---

2611 • 4. 11, 29. "oa€V 1'\ VEe; 1'U6TOV Tep KE vi TnV flATlV E t Pl1KaO'\.
Aristotle (Phlslos, IV, 7, 214 a, 13) makes the same observation without speoifying those about whom he is talking.

27 11 •
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to the conclusion that matter is infinity and indeterminateness
itself.

28

Plotinus establishes this conclusion by showing that infinit
cannot be an attribute or qualification of matter entering fram
outside.

Whatever qualifies something else belongs to the order

of the logoi and forms as a specifying and determining principle,
and it is in itself' limited and determined.

But that which is

limited and ordered by the principles of determination is different from those limiting principles.

As that which needs to be

brought to order and limitation, it is in itself a lack of determination.

It is infinity, in the negative sense of' a lack of all

dete~tnation.

But matter is that which must be brought to order

by the forms which it receives; and so it is infinity itself, and
not infinite merely by reason of an attribute entering in from
outside.

"Matter, tben, must be described as infinity of itself,

by its natural opposition to logos.

Logos is logos and nothing

else, just so, matter, opposed by its indeterminateness to logos,
is infinity 9.J.'1.d nothing else. ,,29
In a discussion o.!' the prinoiples of change in his Physics

30

Aristotle opposes himself to the Platonists and distinguishes
matter from privation (~ cr~Ep~crt~).

28 II.

PlotinuB undertakes to defen

4. 15.

29~.,33-37.

Trans. revised from MacKenna, p. 117.

30Aristotle, PhYSiCS, I, 9. 191 b, 35 - 192 b, 6.

31
the Platonic identification of the two against the Stagirite and
his interpreters. 3l Anyone maintaining, he says, that matter and
privation are identified in substratum (6KOKEt~lv~) but differ in
(A6y~)

definition

must be prepared to give a definition of each
which will not include the other. 32
Plotinus takes up the

argwl~nt

by stating three ways in whlc

two definitions can be distinct from one another.

?irst of all,

they can be altogether different, neither one involving the other
/

But, as Brehier points out, such distinction in the definitions
of matter and privation is not consonant with Aristotle's view in
which matter and privation mutually involve each other.

Since

Aristotle holds that definitions refer to the essential natures

0

things,31./- he should also hold that totally different definitions
would involve totally different natures.
The second way in which two definitions can be differentiate
1s the way in which snubnose 1s differentiated from snubness, a
familiar Aristotelian example.

But this cannot be the required

definitional distinction between matter and privation, because
the two definitions would mutually involve each other.
The third and last way according to which Plotinus a.llows

3lSse Br&hier, Enn6ades, II,
32 11 • !~. 14.
33Brehier, Enneades, II,

52-53.

53.

34E•G., see Posterior AnalItios, II, 3, 90 b, 30.

32

that two definitions can be distinct is a distinction in which
only one definition involves the other, as, for example, the
definition of fire involves the concept of heat but the def1nitio
of heat does not involve the concept of fire.

This, however, is

the distinction of a form from. the subject 1n which it is found.
If privation is merely a form under which matter appears, there
can be no identifying them in substratum. 35
The conclusion to be drawn frOll1 this argUlnentation,36 though
Plotinus does not draw it 1n so many words, is that, since completely distinct definitions of matter and privation cannot be
given which will be consistent wth identifying them in sUbstratum, there is no distinction at all between matter and privation.

PlotinuB clearly affirms that matter is identified with

privation,37 which is "neither a quality nor a qualified entity;
it is the absence of quality or of anything else, as noiselessness is the absence of noise and so on.
negation. tt38

A privation is a

Why was Plotinus so anxious to insist upon a complete identi
fication of privation and matter?

3511 •

The reason is not altogether

4. 14.

36The line of Plotinus' argument has been filled out here
with the aid of Br&hier, Enn'ades, II, 53.
37 I1 • 4.• 14. See also II.
38 II • L~. 13, 20-23.
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clear, but some considerations do present themselves.

As will be

brought out at greater length below, Plotinu5 insists upon the
negative aspects of matter, calling it non-being, utter destitution, and essential lack of all qualification.

If matter is

simply absence of form and quality, and if privation is de.fined
in the same tenlls, their complete identification in Plotinus t
philosophy becomes more consistent, at least within his ow.n syste
Furthermore, the beings of the Intellectual Realm, though graded
on different levels, are completely determined and perfect in
themselves; hence, they are not deprived of anything.

As far as

the present author has been able to observe, Plotinus speaks of
privation only in connection with the beings of the sensible
realm; the individual human soul, which is in contact with both
worlds, suffers privation and evil only to the extent to which it
is involved with matter.
A recurring theme in Plotinus t treatment of matter is the
completely negative status which he assigns it in the hierarchy
of existents.

Matter is altogether outside the realm of being;

it is the non-being (TO ~~ ov).

This non-entitative aspect of
matter is particularly insisted upon when Plotinus takes up the
question of evil, as will be seen in a subsequent chapter of this
thesis.

He is hardly less inSistent, however, when dealing with

matter as the substratum of sensible bodies.
IItrhe distinctive character of' matter, then,
than its very essence.

This character is not ac

consists rather in a relation to other things, the relation of being other tl~ they.n 39

Plotinus goes on to add that everything

except matter has not only the relationship of being "other" than
everything else, but that it is also its own form and is an entity
in ltsel.f.

Matter is sim.ply the nothern and has no entity of its

own, since it has no form of its own.

Plotinus even adds that it

would be better to call matter the "others,n since the sin.gular

40

form might imply a certain determination even in its otherness.
It is clear, as Plotinus notes,4. l that lnatter cannot simply
be identified with alterlty or otherness

en

l~Ep6~~~).

Any in-

dividual entity will be different from or "other thann every other
entity.

But matter is identified with that aspect of alterity·

which stands in opposition to authentic beings.

In other words,

matter is that which is opposed to or is "other than" being.

It

is in this precise aspect that matter is identified with privation, since privation too is that which is opposed to the true
beings.
Matter, then, as is evident from the foregolng consideration
and as Plotinus clearly states,42 1s essentially relational. AS
a substratum, it neaessarily implies a relation to that which 1s

39 1I • 4. 13, 20-28.
t~o1I. 4. 13.

411I • 4..
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Lt2V1. 1. 27, 28.

Trans. revised from MacKenna, p. 114.
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not a substratum but is external to it and aeta upon it to bring
it to form and order.

In other words, matter is the potential

(~C

Ouvap.Et), and in the treatise "On Potential and Actual Being.,43
Plotinus takes up the question in SOIne detail.
Berore categorizing matter as the potential, Plotinus very
carefully distinguishes the meaning of the tenns the potential
(~O

Ouvap.Et), the actual (TO

~VEpyE(~),

potency (~ Ouvap.ts), and

act (~ ~vlpYEta).
Being in potency cannot be independent of that to tvhich it
is in potency.
statue.

Bronze, for example, is potential to the finished

But if it were simply bronze, incapable of any further

modification or change, it would Simply be itself and in no sense
potential.

The potential, therefore, signifies that a being is

already. in a sensa, something other than itself, since it can
become something e18e. 44
Now there are two possible :ays in which a potential being
can be actualized; either the being in potency will remain after
the change what it was before, as when a statue is fashioned out
of bronze, or it will be entirely changed in the process, as air
is changed when it becomes fire--to use Plotinus' example.

In

the first case, tae being in act is not entirely different f'rom
the being in potency, but consists in the addition of
L~3II.

5.

4411 • 5.

1.

a.

forl1l to

,36

the being in potency.

In the second oase the being In act is al-

together different from the being in potency.45
Briefly, then,

~

20tential or being in potency is the

~

stratum of the various modifications, shapes, &nQ i'orms which it
can receive.

~

actual or being in act is the composite of a

form and the sUbstratum.

Potencl, as Plotinus employs the term,

refers to the productive force which brings a potential being to
actualization, while!.£! is the form of a. particular beinE, which
makes that being exist in act and no longer in potency.4
In which of these categories will matter fall?

6

As Brehier

remarks,47 it is not easy for flotinus to fit his concept of matter into categories which were not made for it.
exist in potency to
their own right.

somethinf~

All beinss which

else also exist as beings in act in

But matter is precisely that which underlies

all sensible beings and is in potency to them all.

It follows,

then, that matter is in itself nothing actual at all; it is nonbeing.

No objection to this conclusion can prevail, since matter

cannot be any sensible being--these are founded upon

nEt

t'ter--nor

can it belong to the realrli of forms. since it is utterly formless.
Failing on both these counts to be classified among true beings,

1.t.5II • 5.

I &. 2.

1~.6Ibid.

1.t.7 Brehier, Enn~adeB,

II, 7L~.
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it is all the more emphatically non-being. 48
Matter, then, can be considered as the purely potential.
Unlike all other beings in potency, matter is nothing actual of
itself; otherwise it would be matter merely in the limited sense
in which bronze is the matter of a statue.

The existence of

matter is merely the existence of what is to become.

l~iorel'}veI',

the potentiality and non-being of matter is comparable to the
potentiality of bronze under change, 1.e., Just as bronze remains
bronze after becoming a statue, so ulatter remains simply matter,
and, as such, retains its utter potentiality and its status as
non-being.

IIBut matter is outside and apart from being.

It can-

not change, and so it remains forever waat it always was; that i8,
it is forever non-being_,,49
The

non~entitative

status of matter lies at the heart of

Plotinus t theory of matter considered both as substratum of
sensible beings and, as will be seen, as the principle of evil.
He 1s capable of waxine eloquent on the point, and his own words
will serve to emphasize his doctrine.
It ffiIattef) is a sort of feeble and obscure image
which cannot assume any form. Matter thus has the
actuality. of a phantom (efbooAov), the actuality of an
illusion ~it., a lie--To weubo~ It is illusion in the

48 II. 5. 4 .

49 11 • 5. 5, 11-13. Trans. revised trom Katz, ~ PhilosophI
of Plotinus, p. 133. The unchangeableness of matter will be
taken up at greater length in the following ohapter.

absolute sense of the term and thus that which is not
real. If matter then is actual non-being, non-being
preeminently, that which really is not real, it is far
removed from being an actual thing; for non-belng is
its real nature. If it exists at all, it must not be
an actual thing, but, f~~ from real being, must have
its being in not be1ng.~O
The question arises here and demands some sort of answer as

to what Plotinus means when he says that matter is non-being.
Does he mean to deprive matter of every vestige of reality and
make it equivalent to pure nothing?

Or is there some positive

element of exis tenca left to matter, e van though it stands outside the realm of beings?
Any answer to this question will have to take into consideration what Plotinus understands by being.

First of all, it shoul

be clear from a consideration of the whole philosophy of Plotinus
that being 1s not transoendental; not everything that exists 1s
ipso f aoto a being.

The One oertainly is something real for

Plotinus, but it is not a "being. u51
the Greek tradition of thought.

Plotinus Is clearly within

For the Greeks "beingtl is th.at

whioh is Itmited, determined, fonned, it is that whlch is intelligible. and they had no conception of an infinite intel1eot
capable of comprehending an infinite being. 52

5°11. 5. 5,

21-27.

Trans. by Katz, p. 133.

Slsee Chapter II, pp. 13-14.

See also V. 2. 1.

52For P1otinus' words on "being" as that whlch Is limited
and deternlined see V. 1. 7, 19-26.
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The One. then, is non-being is the sense of something greate
than or beyond being.

It is precisely because it is no particula

being that it can beget all beings. 53

Now matter, too, is non-

being) but obviously it is not non-being in the same way that the
One is.

It is non-being because it is formless, unlimited, un-

determined; but it is not that which is beyond limitation and
being, but that whioh is lacking limitation and for.m.
being.

It is belo

But can it be that matter exists even though it is not a

being, just as the One

e~sts

but is not a being?

In the opinion of the present author Plotinus does want to
preserve that much of a positive element in the non-entity.jf
matter.

The wnole tone of his discussion of matter seems to

militate against making matter simply nothing.
SRYS

Even though. he

that matter is tfnothing in itself,tt 54 the context indicates

that he.means nothing of actual being or nothing in aot.

If

mat-

ter is in potency for everything B...l'ld is truly a substrat'UlJ1, it
seems hard to conceive of this as purely nothing.
SOMe indications that Plotinus did not wish to remove all

existence from the ultimate substratum can be found in his text. 5

53v. 2. 1.
5411 • 5. 5, 5-6.
55The indications

evil as non-being.

,
QU1'O.

are even clearer when Plotinus treats of
This will be brought out in Chapter V.
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In a passage which has already been conSidered,56 P10tinus asks
whether or not matter is simpl.,. the same as tfotherness" or
alterity.

Hie answer is that it is the same as that part ot

alterity which is opposed to true being.

"In this sense,ff he

says, "the non-being has a certain measure of being. n57

Again,

in the passage cited above 58 where Plotinus is describing the
non-being ot: matter, he speaks of it as a "feeble and obsoul'e
image," "the aotuality of a phantom," an "illusion," having "its
being in non-being."

Allot these modes of expression point to

the fact that for P1otinu8 the non-being of matter is not the
non-being of absolute and unqualit:ied non-existence.
If matter is non-being and it: only beings, as possessing
form and determination, are knowable, the question arises as to
how matter ever comes to be known.

The answer is that matter is

known only through the intelleot by means of a reasoning process
(AOY tall-CiS) •

Certainly matter is unknowable to the sense faoulties. "For
it is not perceived by the eyes, since it is without color.
by the hearing; tor it bas no sound.

Nor by the smell, or the

taste; tor it has neither moisture, nor vapor.
percei.ved by the touch?

$6See p.
571I.

4.

Is it, theret:ore,

Certainly not, because it is not a.

34.
16, 3.

58s ee pp. 37-38.

Nor

H

ov.
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body.n59

Plotinus goes on to conclude that it is known only by

reasoning, and this reasoning process, he says, is not intellectual (OOK tK vou); it is empty (xeveS).
This last statement, that the prooess of knowing matter 1s
not ot the intellect, must be balanoed against P1otinus' statement earlier in the same treatise where he affirms that it is the
intelleot whioh knows the constituents, i.e. matter and form, or
oompound beings. 60 The intellect is oapable of analyzing compound beings into their elements.

The 1e:st element in bodies is

matter; and this the intellect affirms as a sort of impenetrable
darkness devoid of form and of the illumination which is in beings as a result of form.
To give a further explanation of the knowledge ot matter,6l
Plotinus has recourse to the «spurious reasoning" (veeos
of Platots Timaeus.

).,0"( H1P.eS

Since matter is the indeterminate, it oan

only be known through an indeterminate knowledge.

It is achieved

not so muoh through an act of the intellect (voncrts) as by a
negation of this act. 62
The indetermination of the soul in this "spurious reasoning"
is not complete ignoranoe and absence of knowledge.

59 I1 •

1.1.•

6°11.
61

4.• 5.
4. 10.

II.

12, 28-31.

There is a

Trans. revised from Taylor, p. 37.

62 This is what P10tinus has in mind when he said that matter

)

positive element to this indetermination, much like the awareness
that the eye haa of darkness.

In knowing matter the soul puts

aside all sensible forms, which correspond to light; and what 18
left is a residue which it cannot bring to determination.

There

is, then, a quasi vision of shapelessness, colorlessness, aize1esaness.

This vision of matter is not the same as having no

understanding Whatsoever; in the latter case there is no affirmation or experience, whereas in the knowledge of matter there is
the impression or experience of the formless. 63

In view of the overwhelmingly negative treatment which
Plotinus gives to matter, some question may arise as to what part
matter as a substratum plays in the emanational scheme.

A brief

consideration of the necessity of matter will give evidence of
the essential role it plays in Plotinus t philosophy.
"lrJhatever may be the place of liberty in Plotinus' thought,
the message of his text is that the emanational process proceeds
by way of necessity.64

Each level of being that has productive

potency must give rise to the next level below;65 and if there
is something after the First, the enmnational process will

is known by a non-intellectual, empty reasoning process.
63 II.

4•

10.

64see Chapter II, pp. 17-18.
65 IV • 8. 6.
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necessarily arrive at a last.

Thus matter is a necessary ele-

ment in the emanational process.

It stands as the outer limit to

which the energy of being can reach.
I·lore specifically, the Great Soul receives its being and
perfection fronl Nous, but in a less tight-knit unity, since it is
another step removed from the perfect uni ty oJ' the One.

Since

the Great Soul also has its communicable perfection, "it must unfold from some unified principle as from a seed, and so advance
to its term. in the sense world.,,67
In answer to the question which he poses to himself on the
way in which the Great Soul comes to its intercourse with the
sensible world, Plotinus notes that without the existence of
bodies the Great Soul could not have gone forth in accord with
the law of emanation. 68

This does not mean that bodies ever

existed apart from soul or that matter "vas ever entirely devoid
of order.

It simply means that the Great Soul engendered a place

for itself by producing bodies.
tion of the

Plotinus describes this produc-

sensible world in the following terms:

tiThe Great

Soul • • • , as a hugh illumination pouring outwards, comes at last
to the extreme bourne of its light and dwindles to darkness;
darlrness, now lying there beneath, the Great Soul sees and by

66See I. 8. 7.
67 IV • 8. 6, 8-10.

68 rv • 3. 9.

Trans. revised from Mac Kenna, p. 362.

this

seeing brings to shape; for in the law of things this ultimate
depth, neighboring with Soul, may not go void of whatsoever degree of logos it can absorb.,,69
'fhe necessity of bodies and the sensible universe in the
emanational process involves with it the necessity of matter, because matter is required for the existence of' bodies. If there
were no such thing as matter to be a substratu.rn f'or the Idea-f'orm
of bodies, the Idea-forms would &mply remain united in the Great
~~oul.

l"urtherrnore,

rna tter

is thf.7 basis for the unity in beings

composed of several forms. 70

In connection with the neoessary existence of matter, the
interesting and philosophically relevant question of the origin
of rna tter can be raised.

I.r all reality and goodness ultimately

come i'rom the One, where does mat ter as the total absence of belng and goodness come from?
In one of the very few places in which he even touches on

this question Plotinus gives us a choice.

Either matter is

eternal, or it is a necessary consequence of the causes prior to
it.7l

This disjunction of eternal matter and caused matter hard-

ly seems pertinent, since PlotinuB clearly

69 Tbid ., 24-28.

-

7°11.

4.

12.

71 rV. 8. 6.

~old8

an eternal

Trans. revised from MacKenna, p.268.
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emanation of the universa. 72

trhe sense ot' the disjunction, then,

is probably that the .former meniher implies tha t matter is a

principle uncaused by the emanational process, while the latter
member stands for matter as a caused principle. 73
If matter is eternal, Plotinus says, the very fact of its
0xistance renders it impossible for it not to have some share in
the principle of good, which cO!Dmunicates i tselt' to everything in
tho measure in

w~ich

each can receive that co:rnmunication.

On

the

other hand, if matter follows from the causes which precede it,
then it is necessarily bound up with the principle which gave it
eXistence. 74
One.

This principle would, of course, ultimately be the

Plotinus himself makes no choice between these tw·o alter--

natives, but he is careful to avoid a total break between matter
and the source of being, regardless of which choice is made.

In

this way he avoids any radical dualism in his philosophy.
On this pOint a difference may be noted in the opinions of

two corrunentators on Plotinus.

£listorius, attending to the nega-

tive aspect of matter as non-beine, denies that it is created
either in time or from eternity.75
is not be created?

How, he asl'.:s, can that which

Dean Inge, on the other hand, interprets

72 See III. 2. 1.

73cr . 3rehier, ~ philosoEhie ~ Plotin, p. 206.
74 rv • 8. 6.
75pistorius, Plotinus a.nd NeoElatonisrn, pp. 68, 70.
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Plotlnus as holding that matter is created, though not in ttme. 76
Inge, however, is not thinking of creation in the Christian sense
of !2i nihilo.

Such a concept, he feels. has no meaning when th.e

question is of eternal creation..

Eternal creation Signifies only

a relation of dependence on the creator.
It is not at all obvious what Plotinu8 himself wiehes to hoI
on the subject.

If matter is the same as "nothing,~! t.hen there

is no problem and Pistorius is certainly correct.

On the other

hand. if there is any positive element or reality to matter, then
from the point of view of preservine a monistic philosophy, as
PlotinuB seems to want to do, he olieht to h&.ve matter proceed
somehoW' from the First Principle; ucain from the point of vieH of
the total opposition of matter and true being he ourht to maintain a radical distinction between the substratum of the sonsible
world and the productive hypostases of' the Intellectual Pealm.
Pistorius, it may be said, overlooks the possibility that
matter is more than mere nothing.

Inge, accordine to Pistorius t

criticism of his interpretation,77 apparently confuses Ir.atter
with the sensible universe.
The nature of matter as the substratum for sensible bodies
has been considered.

The non-entitative status of this sub-

76Inge • ~ Phi1osoph.y

2! Plotinus, I, 143-44.

77P1storius, Plotinu8 ~ £eo~latoniwn, p. 68.
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stratum, as well as the necessity of it in Plotinus' total metaphysic and the manner in which it is known, have also been
treated.

In the following chapter a closer stuuy will be made of

a peculiarly Plotinian view of matter, namely, its absolute
impassivity and oonstancy in the changes which bodies undergo.

CHAPTER

IV

THE IMPASSIVITY OF MATTER
Reference has already been made l to the fact that Plotinus
views matter as a changeless constant, totally unaffected by the
comings and goings of various forms which enter into the constitution of bodies.

A very clear instance of this occurs in the

last chapter of the treatise "On Matter," in which Plotinus
affirms the identification of matter and privation. 2 To the
objection that privation and indetermination must cease to exist
when the absent form is at last present, he merely replies that
form and determination, far from destroying privation and indetermination, actually confirm that native state.

Plotinus

finds analogous situations in sowing, which brings out the
natural quality of the land, or fecundation, which makes the
female more deeided1y female. 3

I

Chapter III, p. 37.

2

II.

4. 16.

3As Brehier notes (Enneades, II, 55), this is hardly an
answer to the Aristotelian position that privation ceases to
exist after change takes pla.ce. The answer simply shows the
radieal difference between the thought of Aristotle and
Plotinns.
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In a treatise entitled "The Impassivity of the unembodied,,,4
chronologically later than II.

4,

again and at much greater length.

Plotinus takes up the question
The purpose of the treatise is

to show that whatever is not a body cannot undergo any change.
The first five chapters are devoted to showlng that individual
souls remain unchanged despite the activities in which they engage and the passions to which they are subject in oonjunction
with their bodies.

The last fourteen chapters of the treatise

undertake to show that matter, incorporeal in its own fashion, is
an impassive substratum, unmoved, as it were, by the changes whic

take place in bodies.
Plotinus lays the foundation of his doctring of an impassive
substratum on the non-entitative status of matter.

He prefaoes

his discussion of the question by pointing out the unreality of
the sensible universe--the more bodily, massive, and inert a
thing is, the further removed it is from the life and mcvemsnt of
the true beings of the intellectual Realm--and reiterating the
profound opposition between matter and be1ng. 5 His doctrine here
is a restatement of what has already been considered concerning
the non-being of matter.
Since the very nature of' matter is to be other than true being, it can maintain itself only by being closed (aO€KTov) to any

4111 • 6.
5III. 6. 6 & 7.
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assimilation of being or even an image of being.

Only thus can it

maintain its oomplete !lothemess tl to all being; once it were
united with any form, it would cease to be matter, the all receptive.

nIt Is neoessary, however, that matter should remain the

same, While forms enter into it, and that it should be impassive
during their egress from it, in order that they may always enter
into and depart from it.,,6
The necessity of the impassivity of matter oan be further
demonstrated by a oonsideration whioh Plotinus evidently borrowed
from Aristotle.

In the Q! Generatione

~

Corruptione Aristotle

shows that only oontraries, whIch are generically "like" and
speoifically "unlike," are mutually related as agent and patient
in change. 7

Thus, as both Plotinus and Aristotle note, that which

is hot 1$ changed by that which is cold.

Another ex:ample of' change

between oontraries, Plotinu8 points out,8 is a fire burning out
and ohanging into another element.

It is the fire which has

ohanged; one would not say that matter burned out or ohanged.
The oonclusion which Plotlnus draws f'rom this is that there is
passivity and changeableness only where corruption is possible
through the interaction of contraries.

But, he says, it is

impossible for matter to oorrupt, since there is nothing into

61II • 6. 13, 29-31.
See

Trans. by Taylor, p. 103.

7Aristotle, De Gen. et Corr., I, 7. 323 b, 16 - 324 a, 9.
n. 1

Brehie~, F~neiQea;-IIY; ~

8III. 6. 8.
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which it can change.

The idea here seems to be that if matter

changed into anything, it would have to become 80me particular
being and thereby cease to be matter. 9
It may strike us as amazing, Plotinus remark8,10 that matter
remains impassive despite the presence of various forms which come
and go.

The answer ls, though, that the forms expel one another;

and so it is the composite of matter and tor.m which is affected by
change, while matter alone remains unatfected.

"Matter does not

increase in its composltion with an approaching torm; it does not
then become what it is through the approach ot torm, nor does it
decrease with its departure.

Matter remains what it was from the

beginning. nll
Plot1nu8 was well aware that an entirely impassive matter
would not be congenial to everyone's philosophical thought;
Aristotle 1n particular canes to mind. 12 It would seem, Plotinus
says by way of objection to his own pOSition, that matter is
necessarily aftected by the changes that take place in bodies,
since it is the receptacle for qualities which interact upon one
another.

Natter is caught up in the middle of all this activity

as being the ground for the various qualities.

Furthermore, it

cannot be said that gmtter is separate trom qualities, since it is

9Cf. III. 6. 10.
10111. 6. 11.
11Ibid., 1$-18. Trans. based on Brehier, Enn'ades, III, 109.
l2Cf • Breh1er, Enneades, III, 92.
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their substratum.

But whatever is present to a substratum imparts

to it some thing of 1 tself • 13
Plotinus undertakes to &nswer this objection which he proposes to himself by distinguishing two general ways in which one
thing can be present to another. 14

In one type of presence one

thing changes the other to which it is present, as is especially
true in the oase of living beings.

Though Plotinu8 does not

elaborate the pOint, it may be assumed that he had in mind such
changes as growth, disease, and death, which are effected in an
animal through some qualifying "presence. n
The second type of presence which Plotinus claims to tind
1s, of course, that in which the subject is not ohanged by the
presence of something else.

An example of this latter type of

presence can be found in the impassivity of the individual soul,
whioh, Plotinus says, remains essentially unchanged for all its
15
acts of knowledge and desire.
Other examples of this type of
presence are deSigns in wax, light on an illuminated object, coldness in a stone, color in a line or surfaoe.

The point which

Plotinus 1s bringing out in these examples is that the subject of
these various mod1fioations remains what it was; 1.e., wax remains

13111. 6. 8.

14111. 6. 9.
15The f1rst part of the treatise "On the Impassivity of the
Unembodied tl was devoted to establishing this pOint.
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wax, stone remains stone, etc.

This latter type of presence is

the type of presence which is claimed for qualities in matter.
The substratum or subject remains what it is for all the changes
which occur, as it were, on its surface.
One may well wonder whether this distinction which Plotinu8
makes between types of presence really answers the difficulty_
At best it has the air of an

~~

distinction, and it may well

be doubted that Aristotle would accept the examples offered as
proving the point.

The wax and stone certainly remain wax and

stone, but not in the altogether unqualified sense which PlotinuB
wants to hold for his impassive matter.

Logically Plotinus must

hold that matter is altogether impassive, once he has established
it as non-being.

It appears to the present author, however, that

he would make a much better defense of his doctrine if he would
appeal exclusively to the unique character of matter as non-being
instead of trying to compare it with other types of substrata.
Ultimately, it seems, he is going to have to hold, at least in
principle, that matter is a substratmn which is "outside of" or
It

apart from" its qualifying forms .. 16
Plotinus moves on to another consideration which provides a

l6SuOh "separation" of substratum and forms seems to be
in III. 6 .. 9, 37-44. It should be noted that III. 6. 9
is an answer to an objection in III. 6. 8, 12-20, part of which
implies that a substratum oannot exist "apart from" (l~ru) its
qualifying for.ms. This point will be discussed again below in a
brief evaluation of Plotlnus' ooncept of an impassive matter.
~plied
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more constructive answer to the Aristotelian objection and one
whieh is more pertinent to his own doctrine on matter.

Again

Plotinus has recourse to the thought of Aristotle that only contraries act on one another, and that qualities which are simply
different leave each other una.ffected.

"But things which do not
have a contrary cannot undergo the effects of a contrary. nl 7 But
matter, Plotinus leaves us to inter, hac no contrary.18

The con-

clusion ot this reasoning is:
Hence it is necessary that, if anything suffers, it should
not be matter, but something which is a composite of matter and form, or, in short, that it should be at one and
the same time many things. But that which is alone and
separate from other things and which is entirely simple
will be impassive to all things, even if it is caught up
in the midst of their interaction on each other. • • •
Granted that there is a mutual interaction according to
the natures of those things which come together in matter;
matter itself, however, is muoh more impassive than such
qualities in 1t, which, it th~y are not contraries, are
unaffected by each other. 19
Plotinus' interest in the problem of matter and magnitude has
been discussed above. 20

He returns to the question here because

one of the reasons why matter is thought to be passive is that it

17111. 6. 9, 34-3$.

/

/

Trans. based on Brehier, Enneades, III,
.

107-108.

l8In the treatise "On the Nature and Souroe ot Evi1sTf (I. 8)
Plotinus explicitly states that matter as essential evil is the
oontrary of the Good or the One. A comparison of these two views
will be taken up in Chapter V.

19111 • 6. 9, 35-44.

also III. 6. 19.

Trans. revised trom Taylor, p. 96.

20Chapter III, pp. 25-28.

Cf.
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i8 thought to be an extended magnitude capable of division into
various parts. 2l Plotinus reiterates the same teaohing in this
treatise 22 as he proposed in II. 4, n~ely, that matter of itself
is unextended but takes on the appearance of extension through
oontact with the Idea or logos of magnitude.
Onee it is admitted that matter Is essentially devoid of
extension, then it is easy for Plotinu8 to explain how matter remains tmpasslve under various ohanges in the magnitude of bod1eB.~
Magnitude is simply an imaging on matter of the Ideal-magnitude
and pertains to the oomposite of matter and form rather than to
matter alone.
horse.

ConSider, for example, the magnitude of a man or a

When the man or horse oease to exist, their magnitudes

also cease to exist.

What remains oonstant is the magnitude of

mass in general, whioh is manifested in various bodies at various
ttmes.

Magnitude, then, 1s one of the components of bodies, in-

deed, it 1s implied in the very notion of a body.

But matter,

sinoe it 1s certainly not a body, has nothing to do with magnitude
and is totally unaffected by dtmensional variations of bodies.
ttMa tter preserves its na ture; magnitude is only a garment whioh it

wears because it must follow magnitude wherever the latter's
oourse leads it.

But if that in which it is clothed were to with-

2lcr. Brehier, Enneades, III, 93.
22III. 6. 16-18.
2.3III. 6. 16.
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d~aw,

it would

~emaln

what it 1s in itself.

Matte~

has only that

magnitude which the fo~m present in it gives to it.,,24
Another problem which gives some trouble to Plotinue in
maintaining an
pa~tieipat1on

enti~ely

impassive matter is that of matter's

in the Ideas.

He evidently feels that Plato held

some sort of partioipation when he speaks in the Timaeus of the
images of real existenoes passing in and out of space. 25
t~ouble

The

is that the ordinary notion of partioipation involves

change or passivity on the part of the participating subjeot.

Plotinus attempts to solve this diffioulty by devising a typ
of partioipation which does not involve passivity; but he~e agaIn
his solution seems a bit weak. 26 He says that matta~ts participation in the Good is not an authentic partioipation, but one which
is adapted to the nature of matter, leaving it unchanged; any
partio1patlon In the Good and in the Ideas would be
the formless and non-entitative status of

matte~.

tion amounts to, it would seem, is that Plotinus
the name ot

pa~tioipation

for matter--out ot

t~u.

dest~uotlve

ot

What the solut~ies

~espect

to preserve

for Plato?--

and at the same time to deny the fact.
Later on in the same treatise PlotinuB once more takes up the

25Plato,

24 Ib ld., 19-23.
Timaeue,

26111. 6. 11.

T~ans. based on B~'hier, Enneades, III, 120.
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c, 4-5.
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problems or partioipation. 27

He asks himself how matter, as the

non-partioipant, oan participate in being.

This time his answer

is more positive, but it may well be doubted that what he
scribes 1s really any sort of participation.

Matter participates

in being, he says, by flinging baok all that oomes to

an eoho is :f'lung baok from a sounding surface.

de~

it, just as

Because the

s~

faoe oannot absorb the sound and really receive it into itself,
it flings it baok as an eoho; this is what matter does with the
images that oome to it from the Ideas and the logoi.

"Matter re-

mains as it was, taking nothing to itself; it is the oheok to the
emanation & belnS]; it is a ground that repels .1128
Plotinus' dootrine on the impassivity or matter seems to
admit, at least logioally, of several oorollaries whlch serve to
bring into relief the differenoe of Plotinian matter from Aristotelian--and Soholastio--matter.

Although Plotinus olearly states
that matter was never without tona29 or was never unordered,)O

and, furthermore, that the basic elements of the sensible universe
are composites of matter and form,)1 it would seem that this 1s
merely a

~

facto situation, not

~

jure.

Beoause the produotion

27111. 6. 14.
Trans. revised from MaoKenna, p. 217.
29II. 4. 3, 14-15.
28 Ibid • , 29-30.

3Orv. 3. 9, 17.
3111.

4.

5,

2-4;

II. 4. 6, 14-19.
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of the cosmos is from eternity, as has bean noted above,32 there
simply never was a time when matter and form were not conjoined.
But 1i' matter is altogether unaffected, changeless, and constant
despite the variations of the images reflected upon it, there
would seem to be nothing in the nature of matter to prevent its
existing without any forms.

Plotinus would probably reply that,

in the emanational pattern, matter exists only to be the ground or
substratum for bodies; if bodies did not eXist, matter would not
exist either.

This would undoubtedly be consistent With his over-

all view of emanation, but an altogether impassive

u~tter

does

leave the impression that it possesses an independenoe of its own.
Another corOllary of the impassivity of matter 1s that matter
and form do not unite into a Single, substantial oompound.

Ploti-

nus notes with approval that Plato held this preoise position,33
and the ways in which he himself speaks about bodies clearly indicate that such is his own view too. 34 Matter beoomes merely a
condition for the existence of bodies.

If the Ideas and logo! are

not to remain in a unified state in Nous and the Great Soul, they

320hapter III, pp.

44-45.

33 11 1. 6. 12, 1-4.
34Bodies, he says, are images of the Ideas in matter, c~mpar
able to reflections in a mirror. Or again, matter reflects back
the forms that come to it like an echoing surface reflects back
sounds. Plotinus t imagery conoerning matter will be further oonsidered in Chapter VI.
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must be received in a substratum which is

ap

t for extension. 35

Thus matter does not enter into a body as an intrinsic cause; the
radical difference in the nature of matter and form prevent their
intermingling. 36

One may even wonder whether there is any point

in looking for intrinsic causes in bodies as Plotinus sees them,
since they do not seem to be true beings in any case.
It is clear from the discussion thus far that Plot1nus views
matter as the substratum of the material universe.

Furthermore,

this substratum is simply the inert and impassive ground onwhieh
the images of the Ideas come and go.

Natter can be said to be a

receptacle for these image-forms in the sense that the forms are
reflected on it; but it is not a receptacle in the sense that it
truly harbors the forms within itself or enters into composition
with them.

35111 • 6. 18.

36111. 6. 15.

CHJ.\.PTEH V

MATTER AS PRINCIPLE OF

~VIL

Not long berore he died Plotinus wrote and dispatched to
Porphyry a group of four treatises which proved to be his last.
Among these, chronologically listed as the fifty-first, was the
treatise which is to be considered in this chapter, namely, "On
the Nature and Souroe of Evils. 1f

Conoerning these last four

treatises, Porphyry remarks that they show the effects of
Plotinus 1 dec1in1ng powers and that there is a noticeable difference in them from a group of five treatises wh1ch had been
wr1tten not much ear11er. 1
Though the powers of Plot1nu8 may well have been declining
when he wrote the treatise on evil, the style and method of
approaoh is that of the Plotinus of earlier years.

Furthermore,

the thought of this present treatise, in wh1ch he descr1bes matter as the absolute, essential evil and the source of all derived
ev1ls, is merely an elaboration of elements contained in his previous work.

In one of his very first treatises he wrote that the

ugliness of the soul is due to its "inclination towards body and

lpOl'phyry,

1!!.! £!. _P....l_o_t....1n_us_, c. 6.
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lootter. 1t2

In another of hie early works he states that the evil

in this world is a condition of matter or of that

~mieh

is

assimilated to llllil..tter. 3 Again, in the two main treatises on .ulatter whioh have already been considered, Plotinus e..ffirms that
matter is evil because of its utter destitution and lack of any
real partiCipation in the 000d. 4

'rhe treatise on matter as the

principle of evil is, therefore, merely a development of Plotinus f
earlier thought end is conSistent, as this chapter will attempt to
show, with his philosophy of matter as already explained.
Those who inquire into the source of the evil in beings would
do best, Plotinu.s e ays, to discover first the nature of evil; its
source would then become apparent at once.

But evil cannot be

known directly, since knowledge is had through siuulitude vlith
Idea-forms and evil is the very absence of such forms.

The only

way in which we can come to a knowledge of evil is indirectly
through knowledge of good; the act of knowing the good will also
included a knowledge of its contrary, which is evil.5

2I. 6. 5, 49. This is the first treatise in Porphyry1s
chronological list (Life of Plotinus, c. 4). His chronological
list may not give the-iOsOIute orner of Plotinus' works, but
I. 6 is certainly among the first of them.

3v. 9. 10, 18-21.
chronological list.

This treatise is fifth in Porphyry's

411 • 4. 16 and III. 6. 11. Porphyry lists II.
twelfth treatise and III. 6 as the twenty-first.
5I. 8.

1.

4

as the

In accord with this program

~or

nature of evil Plotinus goes on to

attaining a knowledge of the

de~ine

what he means by good.

This he does by defining the nature of

!h!

hypostases of the Intellectual Rea1m.

The Good is that upon which

Good and the other two

all others depend but which is entirely sufficient to

itse~t.

Rous and the Great Soul prooeed trom the Good, but they possess
true being none the less and are in their own way the source and
term ot beings on lower levels; they are, in a proportionate way,
truly good.

Among such beings as these, Plotinu8 says, there is

no ev11. but only the primary, seoondary, and tertiary go04. 6
Since there is no evil to be found in the Intellectual Realm,
which is the realm of true being, it will be necessary to loOk tor
evil in the realm of non-being.

There it will be tound to be a

quasi tor.m ot non-being (olov ,loas ~l ~oO ~~ 8v~os Sv)7 and will
pertain to whatever participates in non-being.

Some idea at the

na ture ot evil oan be had by oonsidering what something would be
whioh lacked all measure, l1m1t, and tor.m; such are the characteristics at evil.

Evil is "forever undetermined, entirely unstable,

utterly passive, never settled, completely poor. n8
Moreover, we must not mistake the t rue nature of evil by considering these characteristics as merely accidental attributes;

6I. 8. 2.
7I. 8. 3,

4-5.

8Ibid., 15-16.

-

6,3

indeed, they derine the very essence of evil.

Wherever evil it-

se1t is found, there too will be found all the oharaoteristios
mentioned above.

Whatever partioipates in evil beoomes like to

evil, but it does not become essential evil.
The properties of evil, i.e., formlessness, indeterminate'"
ness, eto.,do not inhere in some alien subject (here, ~ ~~6~Taa,~)
but they are their own subject.

This is necessarily so, Plotinus

says, since the lack of form and determination, which is the
essence of evil, must have a prior existenoe in itself before it
can acoidentally qualify another being.

Just as there is the

absolute Good and seoondary goods deriving from it, so there must
be the absolute evil (KOKOV TO oGTO) and secondary evils which are
aooidental to other beings.
It must be, therefore, that there exist an absolute limitlessness, an absolute formlessness, and so of all the
other properties which charaoterize the nature of $Vi1,
and, 1£ besides evil ltself there be some evl1 thing,
it is so either beoause it is mingled with evil or tends
toward evil or is produotive of evil. Indeed, reason
discovers that the substratum for patterns, forms, shapes,
measures, and 11m1ts--a substratum whlch is reduced to
order by an order not 1 ts own and which of ltself has no
shatte in good and is merely an image of belng--ls the
very essenoe of evil, i f there can bl an essence of evil.
This is the first and absolute evll.~
Plottnus notes that the non-being of evil is not equivalent
to that which is altogether non-existent. 10 When evil 1s said to
9~., 30-40.

l0ill!., 6-1.

Trans. based on Brehier, Enneades, I, 118.
MJt 5v OE o(h, TO

1t'(lVTt:XWs

ll~ 5v.

be non-being, the meaning is that it is something other than being.

PlotinuB attempts to specify what he means by saying that

the difference of evil from being is not the difference of motion
and rest from being; it is the differenoe of an image of being
from true being.
Up to this point in his treatment of evil Plotinns has merely been determining the nature of evil in itself.
he mentioned matter.

Not once has

Yet it is clear that his description of

evil 1s almost exaotly the same as that of matter.

Both evil and

matter are the very laok itself of all form and determination;
both are said to be non-being; and both are ultimate substrata
with which other beings are mingled or on which they are reflected
The identification of matter and evil is virtually established, it
only remains for Flotinus to make it explioit.
Plotinns introduces matter into his discussion of evil by
showing that beings are evil to the extent that they are associated with matter.

This is true of bodily beings and also of in-

dividual soulse

It is natural to bodies to be evil in some way
or other, because they necessarily participate in matter. ll Even
the forms in them are not true forms, but merely images of the
Idea-forms.

Bodies are in a constant state of flux, unable to

maintain for long whatever degree of reality they may have.
Matte~,

the purely potential, prevents them tram attaining to the

llI. 8.

4.

65
stabIlIty of true goodness and being. 12
While bodies have some degree of evil natural to them, souls
are in themselves entirely good; evidence of this fact is that
there

~e

some souls which are not at all evil.

The evil soul is

the one which is enslaved to that phase of itself from which vice
naturally arises.

This phase of the soul is the irrational ele-

ment, which is open to evil either through excess or defect.

The

soul which is in the service of this phase of itself suffers intemperance, cowardice, involuntary affections, false opinion, and
all the other vices observed in evil souls. l )
But how explain an irrational element in that which is of
itself good?

It is simply that the evil soul, though not vicious

in itself, is associated with matter through its material body.14

Even the rational part of the soul is influenced by this association with matter.

The passions of the body obscure its clear vi-

sion and turn its attention from the consideration of true being
120f. III. 9. 8.
131 • 8.

4.

14It is frequently difficult to reconcile the modes of expression which Plotinus uses in isolated statements with the
whole of his thought. Here, for example, one might think that
every soul connected with body is eo ipso an evil soul and that
good souls are only those separate~rrom their material bodies.
It 1s fairly olear, however, that Plot1nus t thought is that those
souls which attend exolusively to affairs of sense are evil, but
that those which strive to purify themselves and attend to the
intellectual Realm are good and pure. This thought is made explicit in I. 8. 5, ad fin.

--
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to this material realm of becoming.

It is not that the rational

part of the soul is itself joined to matter; but matter 1s so evil
that it can contaminate even that which merely looks toward it.15
Clearly. then, matter is the source of all the evil which is
found in beings below the three hypostases of the Intellectual
Realm.

For matter is "altogether without part in the Good and i8

the very privation and absolute lack of it; whatever comes into
any contact at all with matter becaues like matter. n16
The teaching of Plotinus on this point is clear enough; but
can it explain the particular evils in the sensible universe?
Fire, for example, burns, causes pain, and destroys; sharp instruments cut; soae things are poisonous to man and animals.

In

sueh cases it is not matter which causes evil, but rather the
body which is composed of a form 1n matter.

Hence, the evil ought

to be asoribed more to the particular form than to matter.
Plotinus takes up this objection and, on the basis of his
own cosmology, is able to give an answer. 17

Bodily qualities

which produce evil do so precisely because they are qualities engaged in matter.

The forms Which have entered into matter are

merely images of the true forms, 1.e., the Ideas, which
themselves separated

1.51. 8.

t'~om

matter.

The true,

4.

l6Ibid., 22-25.

171 • 8. 8.

Trans. by the suthor.

sepa~ated

~emain

.fo:rms do

in
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not produce evil; absolute rire does not burn, nor, in general, do
any of the absolute for.ms produce those effects which their images
in matter are said to produce.

The reason why forms engaged in

matter produce evil effects 1s that matter comes to dOluin.ate the
forms and oorrupt them by opposing its own lack of form and determination to their order and determination.

Thus matter is able

to bring it about that the fornlS cease to belong to themselves as
forms only and that they take on the characteristics of matter,
just as food takes on the nature of the animal which oonsumes
it. l8
Evil .. as Plotinus observes, does not oonsist in just any defect whatsoever, but in the complete lack of the Good.

Even Noue

and the Great Soul fall short of the supreme perfection of the
Good, but they are not thereby evil.

But where the lack of the

Good is total and complete, there is found true evil.

This total

lack is found nOWhere but in matter. 19
Matter, then, is the principle of evil precisely because it
is the absolute lack ot all true participation in the Good.

Mat-

ter is the contrary of the Good; and the contrariety here is the
greatest possible, since it is the contrariety ot essenoes.

The

exrunples of contrariety with which we are familiar are the oontra-

rieties of qualities, e.g., sickness and health, hot and cold.
181bid •

-

191. 8. 5.
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But the Good (l.e., the One) has no qualities; hence, nothing can
be oontrary to it merely by virtue of some aocidential attribute.
Therefore, if the Good is to have a oontrary, there will be contrariety ot essences.
The contrary of that Whioh is true being will be that which
is non-being; the contrary of the Good and the souroe of all good
things will be evil and the source of the evil in things.

In all

other cases of contrariety the opposed members have some common
element between them, either belonging to the same genus or
species or at least to the same subject.

But in the oase of the

contrariety of essences between the Good and evil, there is no
common

el~lent;

all the characteristics of the one are entirely

opposed to those of the other. 20

Thus, whereas the One is not

good attributively but is essential Good, matter is not evil
attributively but is essential evil.
In his treatment of the impassivity of matter Plotinus makes
the statement that ohange can occur only through the interaction
of contraries, as has been seen; he goes on to imply that matter
has no contrary, since it is not subject to change. 21 Does the
present doctrine that matter as evil is the contrary of the Good
represent a contradiction of Plotinus' earlier work on the impassivity of matter?

Does it indicate a change in his theories?

20I. 8. 6.
21III. 6. 9.

See above, Chapter IV, p.

54.
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It would seem that an in8pection ot the contexts in which the
various statements occur otfers the possibility ot reconciling the
two opinions.

In the earlier treatise on the impa8sivity ot mat-

ter Plotinus was concerned to show that the substratum ot material
bodIes remains unattected by the ohanges whioh oocur in bodles.
Bodily ohanges oocur by oontrary forms replaoing one another,
while those whioh are not contrary leave each other unaftected.
But these bodily qualities act on eaoh other only through a medium.

Heat, for example, aots on coldness by making a cold body

hot. or, in the case of the basic elements, tire replaces air by
acting upon their common substratum, namely, matter.

But, sinoe

matter is the ultimate substratum, there can be no contrary to it
which could act upon it through the medium of some further substratum.

In other words, there can be nothing contrary to matter

as hot is contrary to cold.

Hot and cold are oontrary qualitIes

whioh modify something else, matter i8 not a quality, but it is
the very ground for all the qualitative changes ot bodies.
On the other hand, when Plotinus is treating of the opposition between Good and evil, he is oonoerned to show the differenoe
Here there is no question ot the Good dis-

~etWGen

two ultimates.

~laoing

matter, the evil, or vice versa, through aotion upon some

third thing as medium.

It is simply that the Whole nature of mat-

ter as the formless, sub-entitative substratum 18 opposed to the
whole nature of the Good as the tormless, supra-entltative source
of all being and goodness.

It could well be that P1otinu8' later
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doctrine o£ the essential contrariety between the Good and matter
as evil represents a modification and correction of his earlier
thought.

But there is no indioation that he ever changed his mind

about the impassivity of matter and its lack of a qualitative contrary.
It is interesting to note that in two incidental pOints,
namely, the knowledge of evil and its necessity, Plotinus' treatment of matter as the principle of evil parallels his treatment ot
it as the substratum of bodily qualities.

The substratum of the

material world is known, as has been .een,22 by a sort of ttspurious reasoning" in which the intellect comes to af.flrm the existence of the formless, just as the eye mows darkness.
is similar in the case of evil.

The process

Vice is not knowable directly but

only as a divergence from virtue.

From a knowledge of partial

evils, such as vice is, we can conclude to vhat absolute evil muat
be, which is altogether without fo~ or any share in gOod. 23

Thus

Plotinus holds that matter, both as evil and as a substratum, 1s
known by abstraction from the order and determination which we
know in beings.
The necessity for matter as a substratum is to be sought in
the inexorable law of emanation.

Matter and the material universe

must exist in order that the productive power of being be exhaust-

22ChaPter III, pp. 41-42.
23

I. 8. 9.

See II. 4. 10.

71
ed.~ The neoessity of evil is also bound up with the emanational
prooess.

"Sinoe the Good is not the only eXisting thing, it is

inevitable that in the procession outward from it • • • there be
a last term after which nothing more can come to be; this tel'!l1
will be evil.

There must necessarily be 80mething after tne

First; so too there must be a last.
has nO part in the Good.

This last is matter, which

This is the necessity of evil."25

It would be a mistake to conclude from Plotlnus' doctrine on
matter as the essential evil and the principle of all other derived evils that he considers the material universe to be wholly evil
The universe i8 a reflection of the true beings of the Intellectual Realm; as such, it has ita own beauty, order, and perrection. 26
Evil never exists by itself, as Plotinu8 remarks at the close ot
his treatise on evil. 27 Thanks to the power of the Good, "evil
necessarily appears bound around with the bonds of beaut,._ ,,28
So~e

commantators on P10ttnus profess to see a contradictIon

in his treatment of matter as the potential substratum and as the
principle ot evil.

Armstrong, for example, says:

24see

Chapter III, pp.
cited there.
251 • 8. 7, 17-23.

42-43,

and the reterences to Plotinua

Trans. based on Br$hier, Enneades, I, 123.

2~.g., see II. 2. 3J II. 9. 8; V. 1. 4.
27

I. 8. 15.

28 Ibid ., 24-25.

-

ex-
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amine shortly the well-known contrad1ction in Plotinus' aocount of
matter in the world of the senses.

He varies between regarding it

as a purely negative conception, absolute potency, and as a positively eVil, anarchic force with a power of reSisting form.,,29
Dean Inge also Lmplies that the two viewpoints are irreooncilably
opposed. 30
On the basis of the exposition of Plotinus' philosophy ot
matter and evil as given in this chapter and the two preceding, it
would seem that the opposition between the two aspects of matter
is not as great as Inge and Armstrong would have it.

It becomes

apparent upon reading the tour main treatises on matter that the
substratum of the material universe and the essential evil are described largely in the same terms.

Both substratum and evil are

said to be non-being, though not pure nothing.

Both are the in-

definite, the negatively infinite, the formless, that which has nO
share in the Good.

Both substratum and evil are known by a cer-

tain indefinite or formless knowledge, which is had by abstraction
from the order and determination observed in partioular beings.
Again, the neoessity of matter as a substratum and as evil 1s the
necessity of completing the outpouring ot being from the One, the
Good.

29Armstrong, The Architecture ot the Intelligible Universe
it P1otinus, p. 8~. ---

~ ~ PhllosoEhl

3°Ing., ~

PhilosophZ ~ Plotlnus, I,

134.
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The orux of the whole question may very well lie in what
meaning is given to the term evil.

If one reads into evil some

meaning of one's own, then there can very readily t. a contradiction between evil as the reader sees it and the substratum as Plotinus sees it.
~nd.

If, however, Plotinus' concept of evil is kept in

the opposition between the two aspects of matter may not be

so great.

Now it seems fairly clear that Plotinus' concept of

evil in the treatise devoted explicitly to the subject 1s largely
negative.

Evil is the

form~.s8J

the unordered, the complete ab-

sence o£ Good) those things which are partially evil are so because they possess some excess or defect, whioh indioates some
lack of order and determination.
It is quite true that Plotinus' ooncept of evil logically results in mintmizing moral evil and reducing it to a sort ot
physioal evil, sinoe the vice of the soul arises through its contact With matter. 3l But if we accept his definition of evil and
oompare it with his definition of matter as a substratum, the oppo
sition between the two concepts does not appear to be as great as
some would have it.

Brehier, for example, says that the positive

aspect of Plotinus' conoept of evil is merely an appearanoe. 32

He

proposes to resolve the apparent oonfliot in P1otinus' two views
•

3lcr. B. A. G. Fuller, The Problem ot Evil in Plot1nu8 (Cambridge, Eng., 1912), p. 274.- -32Brehlel', .&!. philosoph1e

.2!.

Plotin, p. 206.
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of matter on the basis of the dynamics of the procession and return of being.

From the viewpoint of procession matter is evil,

since it fascinates the Great Soul and attracts forms to itself;
from the viewpoint of the return of the forms back to their intelligible principles matter appears as that which is illuminated by
the forms and which receives trom them whatever degree of existence it has .. 33
The reason why evil in Plotinus' philosophy appears to same
commentators as a positive torce may be that they ooncentrate too
exolusively on evil in connection with the soul.

The question ot

the human soul and its oonversion away trom the SOlicitations ot
the sense world was, without doubt, an absorbing interest for Plotinus.

In this oontext Plotinus envisages the soul struggling to

regain or maintain its proper independence of material things.
His philosophy as a whole, however, oannot be reduced Simply to an
ethic.

If, then, we wish to reconstruot Plotinus' basic notion ot

matter, we must distinguish between his metaphysics and his mystioism.

CHAPTER

VI

THE METAPHORICAL DESCRIPTION OF MATTER
There has been a deliberate effort in the preceding chapters
of this thesis to avoid reference to Plotinus' use of metaphors in
the description of matter.

The intention behind this approach was

to gather these metaphors into a single chapter where they could
serve as a confirmation and a review of the doctrines already discussed.
As anyone familiar with the Enneads knows, Plotlnus makes
liberal use of the metaphor to illustrate his point.

Furthermore,

Plotinus' use of the imaginative metaphor cannot Simply be reduced
to a literary embellishment; he very frequently uses it to suggest
by analogy what language is not so well adapted to express directly.1

Clear examples of this use of the metaphor are the radiation

from the sun and water gushing forth from an undiminished spring
to illustrate the idea of emanation.

In his discussion of matter

~.g., se. III. 6. 12, 6-8, where Plotinus explicitly ascribes this motivation for the use of examples to one of Plato's
metaphors. On this pOint Brehier observes (La philosoph!e de
Plotin, p. 20): "t'image, chez Plotin, ntestpoInt un ornament
extdrleur, mais un element integrant de la pens... 11 vise, en
afret, comma il Ie remarque souvant, ~ exprimer des realites que
de langue est impuissant a rendre. 11 reste ales suggerer par
analogie." See also Pistorius, Plotinus ~ Neoplatonism, p. 1.
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Plotinus uses the metaphor to clarity and highlight what he has
already said.

It must be noted, however, that Plotinus does not

simply abandon himself to the use ot images in his philosophYJ h.
i. frequently the severeat oritic of his own metaphors,2 as will
be seen in the course of this chapter.
The sub-entitative charaoter of matter is its most distin-

gui.hing note and the baais for all else that P10tinus saJa about
it.

Speaking precisely in the context of the non-being and unre-

ality 01' matter, Plotinus says that it is "the image and phantasm
01' mass and the desire for subsistenoe. n )

He goes on to add that,

even though matter is an unstable (o~ p£vov) image, it does not
have the strength to withdraw

(~s~ys,v),

so utterly lacking 1s 1t

in the pOwer of true being. 4 Basically the same metaphor et bodily weakness combined with phantom existence is also used 1n the
treatise nOn Potential and Actual Being" to emphasize the unreality ot matter:

"It. {jPatte'!J 18 a sort of feeble and obscure image

(&ae£vl~ T' Kai &~uopov sfOmAov) which cannot assume any tor.m. n5
~.g., see the discussion of the divisibility of the soul into parts at the beginning of IV. 3 and of the use of the simile 01'
radii to illustrate the union of all beings with their common
source in the One in VI. 5. 5. ct. Armstrong, The Architecture ot
the Intelligible Universe 1n the Philosophy ot Plotlnus. p. ~, -n • .3.
- - -3-III. 6. 7, 13.
4.Ibid •• 1 8-20.

-

5II. $.5, 21-22. Trans. by Katz, p. 133.
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This non-entitative aspect of matter is brought out in other
images as well.

P10tinus likens matter to a beggar in its continual striving to attain some share in real being. 6 Or again matter
as a limitation on the creative aotivity ot the Great Soul, is
said to be the "sediment of the superior beings, bitter and ambittering,n7

On another ocoasion, in an effort to distinguish be-

tween matter 1n the sensible world and in the intelligible world,8
Plotinus says that sensible matter 1s qeither living nor intellectual, but that it is "a dead thing which has reoeived order (vtKPOV K&KOa~n~&Vov) ."9
In the sections treating of the knowledge of matter, both as

substratum and as the prinCiple of eVil, it was seen that matter
is known by a sort of "spurious reasoning" 1n which the soul becomes indeterminate, as it were, in order to know the indeterminateness and formlessness of matter. 10 The oomparison which Plotinus tinds most helpful to bring out his meaning here is the "visiontt which the eye has of darkness.

Disoussing the question ot

the knowledge ot formless matter in the treatise "On the Nature

6III.

6. 14,

8-10.

7II~ ). 17, 23-24. olav ~noa~6e~~~ ~~ nponyou~lvmv n'Kpa~
Kal n'Kpa no,ouan~.

aFar the distinotion between sensible and intelligible matter
see Appendix.
9I1 • 4. 5, 18.
lOSes Chapter III, pp.

41-42,

and Chapter V, p. 70.
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and Source

o~

Evils," he says that, just as the eye withdraws from

the light in order to see darkness (TO

aKOTO~

), so the intellect

abandons its own interior light 1n order to see that whioh is its
very OPPosite. ll Matter is to the intellect, then, as darkness is
to the eye; and both faculties have to perform acts contrary to
their natures in order to have knowledge of these objeots.
The same comparison of matter to darlmess was used in the
earlier treatise "On Matter," where Plotinus was oonsidering matter as the substratum of the material world.

Through the use of

our intelligenoe we come to know that matter is the ultimate depth
In eaoh material thing.

(& A6rO~)

"Hence all matter is dark, beoause reason

Is light, and intelleot is reason.

Hence, too, intel-

lect, in oonsidering the logos in eaoh thing, judges that what i8
beneath

~e

logo!7--as a thing beneath light--is dark. just as

the eye, whioh is a thing of light, extending itself to the light
and to colors, which are modes of light, Judges that what 1s beneath colors is dark and material and 1s oonoealed by the colors. ttl2
The image which Plotinu8 uses most frequently in connection
with matter is that of a mirror.

The point which he wishes to em-

phasize through this metaphor is the impassivity of matter.

nBut

11

I. 8. 9, 19-26.

12II. 4. 5. 7-12.
also II. 4. 10, 13-17.

Trans. revised from Taylor, p. 25.

See
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if' someone should say that mirrors (TQ KaTo1cTa)

and transparent

things in general surf'er nothing from the images that are seen in
them, he would adduoe an appropriate example.

Those things whioh

are in matter are images, and matter is even more impassive than
mirrors."l)

The idea here is that the f'orms in material beings

are merely ref'leotions in matter of the Ideas and logoi in the Intelleotual Realm, and that matter is even less af'f'eoted by what i.
reflected in it than a mirror is by what appears in it.
Although a mirror was obviously Plotinus' f'avorite metaphor
for illustrating the impassivity of matter, he was not altogether
unoritical of it.

The mirror itself is visible, since it posses-

ses some degree of reality and has its own for.m.

Matter, however,

is not visible in itself, sinoe it laoks all form in itself and
has no share in true being.

When we view things in a mirror,

there is no inclination to mistake the reflections for real beings
We see the mirror itself and observe that the reflections come and
go while the mirror remains constant.

In no case, however, is

matter visible; we cannot observe matter as such under the image.
refleoted upon it, much less without any image whatsoever.
precisely beeause we cannot see matter itself that we

~e

It is
inclined

to accept the rerleotions upon it as real beings, just as we would
not doubt the reality of reflections in an invisible mirror, it

131I1 • 6. 9, 16-19.

See also III. 6. 7,

40-43
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somehow the

~ef1ections could ~ema1n tor observation.~

In line with his reservations on the metaphor of the mirror

P10tinus offers another comparison which, he feels, gives greater
emphas1s to the invisibility of matter.

"The condition of matter

is much the same as that of a1r which is invisible even when illum1nated, because, even when it is not illuminated, the a1r is 1nvis1ble. tt15 The meaning of this is that matter is like air inasmuoh as no one ever sees matter, whether with or without form,
just as no one ever actually sees the air, whether it is 1llum1nated or not.
Again, in taking up the problem of the impassivity ot matter

In partioipating in true being,16 Plot1nus says that whatever
share 1n being may oome to matter reflects back from 1t "like an
eoho from smooth and even 8urtaces. n17

He goes on to add that 1t

is preoisely because the sound is reflected baok trom eohoing surfaces that we are led to think that it arises there.

The unstated

oonolusion 1s that we are led to attribute reality to material beings for a similar reason.
In another comparison matter is likened to a mother.

Thi.

~I1I. 6. 13, 38-49.

15Ibid., 41-43.

'AAAU '-O\oO,-OV ,-, naaxe\, orov Ka\ A A~p
CPl'Dt'! 0'9£ 't c; l1q?av,;c; l at' \ Kat '-01'£, 81'\ xai ~v£u 1'00 q?mT\a9~va, oOX
£copa'-o.
16See Chapter IV, pp.

17I11• 6.

14. 24-25.

56-57.
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metaphor is one handed down to P10tinus from other souroes. the
18
most likely one being the 'rimaeus.
He accepts this metaphor
only with reservation, because he feels that the role of a mother
in the generation of offspring is too active to express the true
nature of matter.

(&s

If a mother is assumed to be Simply a containe

~~ObeXO~evD~ p6vov)

of her offspring and to give nothing ot

her own substance to it, then Plotinus is willing to allow the
comparison.

He does feel that another comparison from Plato,19

that of "recipient and nurse (ll~oooX1) Kai 'n0t)vl'l) ,n is more suited to bringing out the receptive

and

unproductive aspeot of matte

Matter is simply the substratum, impassive and unresponsive, to
the Ideas and logoi which are reflected upon it. 20
From this brief study of Plotinus' metaphorical descriptions
of matter the main characteristics of matter as they were seen in
the preceding expository ohapters are found to be confirmed.
Physical weakness and phantom existence describe the non-being of
matter; the knowledge of matter is the knowledge of darkness; the
impassivity of matter is that of a reflecting surface such as a
mirror; and the sterility of matter makes the time-honored comparison with a mother somewhat unacceptable.

These metaphors, be-

sides serving as a confirmation of Plotinus' doctrine on matter,

18plato, Tlmaeus, 50 d, 2-3 and 51 a,

19 Ibid., 49 a, 6.
20 III. 6. 19, 17-25.

4-5.

82
are also very useful aids for understanding Plotinus f meaning.
is for this latter purpose, of

cou~se,

that he used them.

It

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The preceding discussion of the nature of matter has elaborated the most important and significant aspects of Plotinus' doctrine.

A brief restatement of the conclusions already obtained

will serve to recall the main outline of his position.
Perhaps one of the best su.mmary answers to the question "What
is Plotinian matter?"

would be that is is the inert, impassive

ground of the material world.
beings in much the same sense

Matter is the ground for material
that~

a movie screen--to employ an

up-to-date ana10gy--is the ground for the scenes which appear on
it.

Matter thus conceived is a substratum, a ~~OKE(PEVOV, and, to

some extent, a receptacle or tl1tOOOX~.
Other characteristics of Plotinian matter worth noting here
are its sub-entitative existence, its necessity, and the fact that
it is kno·wn. by reason alone.

P10tinus classifies matter as noo-

being because of his decidedly Greek concept of being.
the limited and deterluined.

Being is

But matter is indetermina.te and nega.-

tively infinite; hence, it is not a being.

The One also is

un1~

ited and undetermined and, therefore, not a being; but there is no
room for confusion here, because the One is above being as its
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source, while matter is below being as the bare substratum of that
last outpost of being, the material world.
The necessity of matter, as has been seen,
sity Of emanation itself.

1

is the very nece.

This necessity requires that the pro-

ductive power of being, which has its source in the One, extend
itself as far as it can go.

An emanation advances through its

various stages, there is increasing multiplicity and degradation
of unity;

NOllS

is less unified that the One, and the Great Soul is

less unified than Nous.

When the Great Soul comes to produce the

next level of being below itself, multiplioity is already so far
advanced that the only possibility is that these beings be actually distinct and separate from one another.

But this would not be

possible unless there were some ground or base capable of receiving such distinction and separation.

This base is matter.

It 1s also worth noting that matter i8 known only through rational analysis and a so-called ff spurious reasoning. ,,2

P10tinus

was no materialist; in fact, he reacted violently to the materialism of.' the Stoics.

Plotinian matter is not something one gets his

hands on and sees and feels.

In this sense it is a philosophical

reality and is known only in terms of a search tor the ultimate
principles of the material world.
In addition to being the substratum ot material beings, matIsee Chapter III, pp. 42-i~3. and Chapter V, pp. 70-71.
2See Chapter III, pp.

41-42.
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ter is also the essential evil and source of all secondary evils,
as is clear from a study of the text of Plotinus.

This aspect of

matter follows as a corollary from its non-entitative indeterminateness.

~

Plotinus defines good in terms of

Good (i.e., the

One) and those beings which participate in the Good.

The only

choice then is to place evil outside this participation in the
Good; and matter is the only thing which has no true participation
in the Good.
With this picture of matter in mind one is led to wonder just
what Plotinus thought a material body was.

The whole tenor of the

Enneads shows that Plotinus is inclined to emphasize the unreality
of the material universe. 3 A material being, &s Plotinus sees it,
is matter, which is non-being, plus an image of an Idea-form whose
true existence is in the Intellectual Realm.

It is slight wonder,

then, that with this view of lnaterial beings Plotinus should assign them a minuuum degree of reality.
Though Plotinus speaks in Aristotelian terms of forms existing in matter and of matter receiving forms, he obviously envisages no strong union between matter and for.m.

Matter is a condi-

tion for the existence of image-for.ms and the material beings
which result from a union of form and matter, just as a mirror is
a necessary condition for the appearanoe of reflected images.

It

3Th1s idea is very clear in III. 6. 6, where Plotlnus argue.
Wor the unreality of material beings despite their appearances of
reality.
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seems olear that Plotinu8 views the union ot matter and

fo~ al

being no oloser than that of the mirror and the figures refleoted
in it.

The only ditterence is that in the case of the mirror and

the refleotions the mirror has the greater reality, whereas 10 the
case ot me. tter and torm the Im.age"",torm has more reality than the
matter in which it appears. 4
It is instructive to note some at the differences between
Plotinus t concepts of matter and material being and those of St.
Thomas and the later Thomistic Scholastics.

First of all, St.

Thomas and the Scholastics include matter within the pale 01' being, though not without qualification.

Plotinus had to exclude

matter from the rea1m 01' being beoause his notion of being was
univocal. at least to the extent that being was equated with a
certain type ot existence, namely, finite existence.

The Scholas-

tics, on the other hand, are able to include matter under being
because their analogous notion of being extends from the

p~elt

potency (1.e., prime matter) to the purest act (i.e., God).

Mat-

ter tor them 1s a principle of being and rightly called a being
because it is ordained to substantial existence.
Another point ot radical difference in the two v1ews ot matter 1s concerned with its impassivity.

As Plotinus saw it, the

potency of matter 1s never really actualized by the torms which

4FOr a detailed description of the union between matter and
torm and the way 1n wh1ch it is achieved see VI. 5. 8.
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appear in It. 5 It, for example, the Idea of a horse is being 1maged on matter, that matter is nevertheless still in potency to
6
being a horse as well as anything else.
The Scholastics, howeve~
maintain that matter is not unaffected by its forms.

When

the

substantial form of a horse is united with matter, that matter is
no longer in potency to being a horse; it. condition is reall7
changed from its previous mode of existence.

A simdlar observation may be made with respect to the lnde·
te~lnateness

and infinity of matter.

In

the Scholastic cosmology

prime matter, considered merely in itself, is indeterminate atl.d
negatively infinite.

But prime matter never exists merely in it-

selt, it is always limited and determined by some substantial
torm.

Plotinus, however, holds that matter retains its radical

indeterminateness and infinity, even though it is united with
for.ms.

He

would agree that matter never exists without some

form,7 but, since the forms never really get at matter and change
it, matter retains its essential qualities.
As has already been noted in this chapter, the necessity ot
matter in Plotinus' system is an absolute necessity, at least as
absolute as the necessity ot emanation.

50t •

In Scholastic philosophy

Ohapter III, p. 37, and Chapter IV, pp.

58-59.

'!hiS view, ot course, is ultimately connected with the lack
of a close union between matter and form.
7
See II. 4. 3, 14-15.
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the necessity of matter is merely the consequent necessity of a
tact.

That the material universe exists is the result of an in-

telligent and free determination on the part of the Creator.
There did not have to be any material creation; hence, there is no
prior necessity for the existence of matter.

But once God freely

determined to create and did so create, then matter existed of necessity.
Perhaps the most fundamental difference between the Scholastic and P10tinian view of material being concerna the union ot
matter and for...

There has already been occasion to remark that

P10tinus does not conoeive of any really strong union ot matter
and form, certainly not the substantial union whioh was taught
8 Given his concept of matter as the perpreviously by Aristotle.
manently impassive and indeterminate substratum, it was impossible
for P1otinu8 to unite matter and torm into a substantial unit, as
St. Thomas d1d9 in adopting the solution of Aristotle. It could
also be that granting substantial unity to material beings gives
them a greater degree ot reality than P10tinus wanted to give them.
One ot the results of P10tinus t additive union ot matter and
fo~

is that he oomes up with a doctrine whioh greatly resembles

the theory of a plurality of torms current in the Middle Ages.

~.g., see Metaphysios, VII, 1), 1039 a, 3-9.
9E _8 ., see ...........
S.T., I, 45, 8CI 65, 40 •

Brehier thinks that there is fla clear indication" of such a doctrine in Plotinus,lO and it is not too hard to find support in the
text

to~

such a view.

"Fire and

ea~th

and the intermediaries,"

Plotinus says, "are matter and torm, but composite beings
substanoes united

many
(~a O~ ~uvee~a no~ ~oAAa' o&~(at &\~ lv) .n 11

Again, in the treatise

ttOn

a~e

Intellectual Beauty," Plotinus de-

scribes how the Ideas hold everything in their sway; matter is
gripped by the Ideas of the elements, and to these elements are
added other Ideas and still others.

The result of this is that it
1s "diffioult to find matte~ hidden beneath so many torms. n12
Certainly such a view ot the composition of material beings is

-

much different from the Aristotelico-Thomistic view, in which one
substantial form confers all essential notes, such as corporeity,
lite, etc.
Since some oommentators feel that Plotinus' treatment of matter is one of the most oonfused sections in his phi1oS0phy,l) a
brief indioation of some of the difficulties in which Plotinus

lOBrehler,

b!

philosoEhie ~ ~lotin, pp. 200-201.

ltv!, 3. 8, 8-9.

12v.

B. 7, 19-22. It is immediately following this that Plotinus goes so fat as~o~a1+ even matter a form, though it be the
last of fo~s--au~~ LgATU &.OO~ ~,faxa~ov. On this point A~
strong well observes (Downside Review, LXXIII, 49) that this remark by Plotinus is nunp.rall.lea In the Ennead. and 1. quite inconsistent with his normal thought."
13See Chapter I, pp. 1, 2-3.
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seems to involve himself would be pertinent before conCluding this
thesis.
The difficulty with Plotinus' philosophy of matter is not,
as it seems to the present author, a contradiction between matter
as substratum and matter as essential evil, as some have said. 14
Brehier even feels that the discussion of matter as substratum in
II.

4 leads progressively to the conclusion that matter is evil,

a conclusion which he calls the very heart of the Plot1nian con-

cept of matter.

The problem of matter in Plotinus, he adds, 1.

not so much a physical problem--as it is with Aristotle--as it 1.
a religious problem. lS On the other hand, Inse thinks that, i t we
consider Plotinus' philosophy as a whole, there is no identifioa16
tion of matter and the principle of eVl1.
In view of the investigation conducted in the preceding chapters concerning Plotinu. t
explicit thought on this question, and a180 in view of his philosophy as a whole, it is the opinion of the present author that
Inge's conclusion is not justified.
The real difficulty with the P10tinian system, as it seems

14This

71-74.

point was discussed at some length in Ohapter V, pp.

15Brehier, Enneades, II, 47. "IcJ.tte discussion est deetinee a. nous amener progressivement ame conclusion (la matiere
est 1e mal), qui est Ie centre mime de l'idee p10tlnienne de 1a
matiere. La problem. de 1& matiere qui, chez Ari.tote, etalt un
prob1eme physique, devient un probl'me de phI1osophi. re1igieuse."
16
.
Inge, !h! Phl1osophl 2! Plotinus, I, 134-35.
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now, is not that of

~econci1ing matte~

and evil, but that of re-

oonoiling the existence of both of these with an emanational metaphysic.

The whole pOint of such a system is that

neoessa~ily

from one oommon

system is a

tho~oughgoing

source tor all

~ealltYJ

so~oe,

monism.

evil and

eve~ything

which is the Good.
The~e

matte~

ia only one

flows

Such a

p~inoiple

or

eannot be an aetive prin-

ciple, equal but opposite to the Good, as in the dualism of the
Manieheana.
The question, then, is how there oan be anything opposed to
the One; i.e., how oan there be any absolute non-being or absolute
evil, i f the One is also the Good and is produotive only of goodness and reality?

Muoh of the diffioulty and obsourity in Ploti-

nus' discussion of matter and evil seems to

a~ise

from an attempt

to retain both the disorder of evil and the absolute monism ot
emanation.

To give a olearout answer it would seem that Plotinus

should either completely deny the existence of matter and evil or
introduce a seoond prinoiple into his system alongside the One.
As he actually worked the problem out in his philosophy, it appears that evil, partioularly moral evil, loses most of ita torce
and becomes little more than a necessary concomitant

or

the emana-

tional process extending itself to the b1tter end. 17
Conside~1ng

Plotinus' whole philosophy of matter, what, one

might ask, was the basic motive which led hLm to adopt such the-

170t • Wh1ttaker, ~ Neoplatonists, p. 68.
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ories?

The answer to such a question will ultimately have to be

in terms of the basic motive of his entire systeIll, since matter is
merely a part of the total conception.
that of Brahier when he says:

Perhaps the best answer is

"The system of Plotinus, in its en-

tirety, arises from an effort to suppress everything in reality
which can be ~pervious to the life of the sPirit. H1S And in partioular with respect to his

trea~ent

of matter it may be said

that Plotinus' explanation of physical reality "consists in strip.
ping matter, and then bodies, of every positive reality which we
experience in them, since at every stage these realities are marks
of soul.

One will be a good philosopher of nature to the extent

that one knows how to turn the sensible world toward the world ot
the splrlt. H19
18Brehier, La Ehilosophie de Plotin, p. 57. "Le systeme de
Plotin, dans aonensemb!e, na'ftttfun effort pour suppr.1mer tout ce
qu'il peut y avail', dans ls. realite, dtopaque
1a vie spirituelle."

a

£El1

19Ibid., pp. 204-20$. "
le [ ••• , l'explication physique
chez P1otIID' consiste a depouiller fa matiere, puis les corps de
tout oe que l'experience noua montre en eux de realites positives,
alors que, a ohaque degre, ces realites sont des traces de llama;
on sera bon physicien dans la mesure ou l'on .aura convertir 1e
monde sensible vers ltesprit."
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APPENDIX

INTELLIGIBLE MATTER
The preceding discussion of Plotinus' philosophy ot matter
was limited to matter in the sensible world.

Another type ot mat-

ter, however, 1s referred to in the Enneads, a matter which bas
its place among the hypostases of the Intellectual Realm.

Ploti-

nus explicitly discusses this type of matter in the tx-eatise nOn
Matter" already considered in Chapter 111.1

The purpose ot th1s

appendix 1s to explain briefly the nature of intelligible matter
and to distinguish it from sensible matter.
Plotinua adduces several considerations by way of establ1shing the existence of matter in the Intellectual

Re~.

The taot,

whioh he claims to have proven elsewhere, that there are many Ideas requires that they have some common element in their diversity.
The particular form (~op~~)

of each is the diversifying element;

the common element is that which 1s brought to form by the Ideas,
namel,., a matter or substratum tor the formative Ideas.

Another

consideration pointing to the existence of intelligible matter is
l fhe full title of the treatl~e on matter (II. 4) 1s "On the
Two types of Matter (~IEpl 1"?flv 00'0 Uh{l.)V)." The two types ot matter
referred to are intelligible and sensible matter.
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the fact that this sensible world, composed of matter and

to~,

is an imitation of the intelligible world; hence, there must be
matter in the intelligible world also.

Furthermore, though the

intelligible world is indivisible, there exists there a certain
diversity among entities; but diversity is a condition found onl7
where there is a matter offering itself to division and distinction.

2

Plotinus oonsiders intelligible matter as necessarily bound
up with emanation from the One.

In the emanative process two dis-

tinct moments oan be distinguished, the moment of differentiation
or al ter! ty (~ ~ 1'& P01'flS )

and the moment ot re turn (the word used

is a form of the verb lrcH1Tpecpru). Alter! ty i8 the moment in which
the derived being "moves away" from the source, while return is
the moment of "movement baok towardtl the souroe.

These moments in

emanation are not temporal moments, since emanation is an eternal
process} they are rather analytical moments of one reality_
The moment ot alterity in the production of the intellectual
hJPoatases from the One is the moment of indefiniteness and laok
ot form in the being which is produced.

In the state of alterit7

the emanating being can be and needs to be formed and determined
through a return to its souroe.

This stage of the intellectual

hypostases is what Plotinus means by intelligible matter.
The moment of oonversion back to the source Is. the moment in
•
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which the being takes on form and determination.

Nous, for exam-

ple, reoeives its torm and determination through its intelleotual
vision of the One; this vision results in the multiplicity of Ideas which give torm to the indeter.mlnate and "material" moment ot
alterity.3
Plotinus himself points out some of the specific difference.
between sensible matter, i.e., the inert and formless substratum
of sensible being, and intelligible matter, i.e., the moment of
indefiniteness in the generation of the intellectual hypostases.
Matter in this rea1m of generated beings is ceaselessly changing
from one form to another, while intelligible matter is eternally
possessed of the same form.

Again, sensible matter becomes all

things in succession, while intelligible matter 18 all things at
once. 4
Furthermore, although intelligible matter reoeives determination, just as sensible matter does, it has of itself a determinate
and intelligent life; but sensible matter is neither living nor
intelligent.

Plotinus goes on to add that in sensible beings form

and substratum are mere images (erbroAa), whereas in the intelligible world both form and substratum are true be1ngs. 5

3The preceding analysis is an expansion of Plotinus' words
II. 4. 5, 25-37. Cf. v. 4. 2.

4xI. 4. 3, 9-17.

5II. 4. 5,

15-20.
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In short, then, "matter in the intelligible world is a being,
for that which is prior to this matter is beyond being.

But that

which 1s prior to matter in this world is being; hence, {Fensibls-)
matter is not a being, sinoe it is 'foreignt to the beauty of
6
being."
As is clear, the ooncept of intelligible matter is intima tel
conneoted with Plotlnua' ooncept of emanation.

Further questions

may well be raised oonoerning the notion of intelligible matter;
e.g., how is it a being if it 1s 1ndeter.minate?

what is the dis-

tinction between intelligible matter and eaoh nypostasis? what are
the distinctions between the various Ideas themselves and betwe.n
the Ideas and the hypostases?

I'c would be going beyond the scope

of this thesis to attempt to olarify these questions, if, indeed,
they can be clarified through additional study of the text ot PIatinus.

6II.

4. 16, 24-27.

Trans. by the author.
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